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Abstract: Background: A raft of initiatives and reforms have been introduced in many countries
to attract and recruit school teachers, many of which do not have a clear evidence base, so their
effectiveness remains unclear. Prior research has been largely correlational in design. This paper
describes a rigorous and comprehensive review of international evidence, synthesising the findings
of some of the strongest empirical work so far. Methods: The review synthesises a total of 120 pieces
of research from 13 electronic databases, Google/Google scholar and other sources. Each study is
weighted by strength of evidence. Results: The strongest evidence suggests that targeted money
can encourage people into teaching but does not necessarily keep them in the teaching profession.
The money needs to be large enough to compensate for the disadvantages of working in certain schools
and areas, and competitive enough to offset the opportunity costs of not being in more lucrative
occupations, and its effect is only short-term. Conclusions: Continuing professional development
(CPD) and early career support could be promising approaches for retaining teachers in the profession,
but the evidence for them is weak. There is no evidence that any other approaches work, largely
because of the lack of robust studies.
Keywords: teacher recruitment; teacher retention; systematic review; causal evidence; interventions
1. Introduction
This paper provides a comprehensive review of international evidence synthesising the findings
of some of the strongest empirical work on improving the recruitment and retention of school teachers.
Attracting and retaining qualified teachers is a persistent problem that has plagued many countries
for decades. The trends in recruitment to initial teacher training are often associated with the national
labour market condition and the relative attractiveness of other occupations. Shortages are more
severe in some subjects especially for maths and physics where there is a high demand for graduates
in these fields. Compounding this is the growing pupil population. In England, teacher demand has
consistently outstripped supply [1]. Reportedly, more people are leaving teaching than ever before.
Only 60% of teachers remained in state schools after five years and for ‘high-priority’ subjects like
physics and maths, this five-year retention dropped to just 50% [2].
An adequate supply of qualified teachers is important for the provision of an effective education
system. A shortage of teachers can have a detrimental effect on the life chances of children [3–7].
Many countries in Europe have reported a widespread shortage of teachers [8]. Teacher supply
continues to be a challenge in Australia and New Zealand and, in England and the US, the teacher
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shortage is predicted to get worse as the pupil population rises. Across each of these contexts,
the extent of the shortages can vary depending on geographical region, subject area, age of student
and school types.
There are a number of factors which may influence a shortage of people being recruited into
the teaching profession. These predominantly relate to people recognising and opting for what
they perceive to be more favourable alternative career options. From an individual’s perspective,
these decisions may be influenced by the financial rewards available (e.g., salary, prospect of bonuses)
or by their understanding of what the role entails (e.g., required tasks, working conditions, level of
autonomy). Economic and employment cycles can have an impact on the number of people choosing
teaching as a career, with more people seeing it as an attractive option during times of economic
uncertainty [9–13]. It is also the case that government policies could influence teacher recruitment too,
e.g., through funding and allocation of training places, the development of training routes, or marketing
strategies [14].
The shortage of teachers is reportedly also partly the result of people leaving the profession
prematurely. Teaching has often been characterised as an occupation with a high level of turnover
especially among new teachers [15–17]. While all occupations experience some degree of turnover and
career change, turnover in teaching is considered high particularly in the first few years compared to
many other professions, such as lawyers, engineers, architects and professors [18,19]. In the US, it has
been reported that around 40 to 50 percent of new teachers leave within the first five years of entry into
teaching [20]. In England, the attrition rates are similar, particularly in maths, science and languages
subjects [21]. Among the secondary teachers who qualified in 2010–2012 around 66% stayed on in
state-funded schools in the fifth year [2] (Table 8). Government data show that the odds of leaving are
higher for newly qualified teachers (NQTs) and those with stronger academic backgrounds [22].
In countries experiencing teacher shortages, numerous policy initiatives have been introduced
in an attempt to address recruitment and retention issues and the factors which contribute to them.
Many strategies involve financial incentives such as increased pay for teachers (e.g., for those teaching
certain subjects or in particular areas) as well as bursaries or scholarships designed to attract more
people into the profession, or to keep them there once they have qualified. In England, for example,
there is a long history of providing tax-free bursaries and maintenance grants/loans for those entering
training, and additional ‘early career’ payments for those continuing in the role after completing their
NQT year. The amount available is, in theory, associated with the level of shortage. Similar approaches
can be found in other countries experiencing teacher shortages. In the US, there have also been more
widespread interest in variable salaries for those working in certain geographical areas, or in schools
with higher proportions of disadvantaged pupils, as well as some initiatives which seek to reward
teachers financially based upon their performance [23–25].
In more recent years, some policymakers have moved beyond financial incentives for retaining
teachers. A growing awareness of the often challenging working conditions associated with
teaching [26,27] has led to the development of strategies to try and improve these, and in turn make
teaching a more attractive profession. These include induction programmes, access to professional
development, enhancing leadership skills in schools, flexible working. In England, the Early Career
Framework (ECF) [28], introduced in 2020, is part of the wider Teacher Recruitment and Retention
Strategies [29] to support new teachers during the induction years via high-quality mentoring and
professional development, and a reduced teaching timetable.
An increasingly important issue is teachers’ workload. Correlational studies indicate that teachers’
perceptions of workload are strong predictors of their decision to leave teaching [30–32]. In England,
a report published by the DfE [27], based on interviews with 101 former teachers, suggested workload
as the most important factor influencing teachers’ decision to leave the profession. A recent survey
of teachers and those who have left the profession found that ‘workload’ and ‘improving work-life’
balance were the most cited reasons for exiting teaching [33]. An earlier report based on a survey of
over 1000 teachers also identified workload, policy changes and accountability pressure among the top
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reasons for teacher attrition [34]. The DfE launched the Workload Strategy in 2014 to understand and
address ‘unnecessary’ tasks that teachers undertake in the course of their duty. There is no evidence
available on the extent to which schools have engaged with the recommendations put forward from
this consultation, but the Teacher Workload Survey carried out in 2019 showed a reduction in teachers’
reported working hours since 2016. However, the majority of teachers still reported workload as a
serious problem.
2. Background
2.1. Common Approaches Used to Improve Teacher Recruitment and Retention
2.1.1. Financial Incentives (Including Scholarships, Bursaries, Higher Wages)
Financial incentives are commonly used to try and improve recruitment and retention. These are
premised on the assumption that if sufficiently well compensated, people can be encouraged to go
into teaching or be persuaded to stay on in the profession. Identifying what a well-designed pay
incentive should be is difficult because of the numerous challenges and parameters that need to be
considered [35]. Some commentators have suggested that effective incentive plans must offer relatively
large awards to induce behavioural changes [36,37]. A number of American studies have pointed to
the level of financial incentives needed in different contexts. Goodnough and Kelly [38] suggested that
teacher salaries in New York be increased by up to 25% in the lowest-performing schools as the 15%
increase that was offered in 39 of those schools appeared to have little impact in terms of attracting
qualified teachers. Boyd et al. [39] and Hanushek et al. [40] estimated that considerable pay rises
(up to 50%) may be needed to induce more teachers to work in schools with high proportions of
ethnic minority or socioeconomically disadvantaged students. However, if working conditions and
the relative attractiveness of the schools can be improved, then the size of the pay increase may need
not be as large.
Others have argued that a single pay scale does not provide incentives for teachers with skills that
are in high demand in non-teaching fields. Successive governments in England have offered more
to trainees in certain subjects. However, once qualified, teachers then tend to enter the profession at
a similar pay level irrespective of subject area. Recent reports have recommended that teachers in
shortage subjects be paid a ‘salary supplement’ to encourage their retention, particularly in the early
years of their careers [41,42]. Increased flexibility of pay was also introduced in England in 2013–2014
meaning that schools no longer had to use the seniority-based national pay scale but instead could
determine annual pay awards by ‘performance’. Studies have suggested limited impact on teacher
mobility or retention in the same schools thus far [43–45]. There is very little evidence to indicate
whether performance-related pay works either in improving teachers’ performance or retaining them
within the profession [46].
2.1.2. Alternative Routes into Teaching
Another approach often used to address the critical shortage of teachers is alternative certification
or alternative pathways into teaching. These offer options different to the ‘standard’ or ‘traditional’
routes within a particular region or country and often provide ways into the profession for those
wishing to train ‘on the job’ or who are working in other careers or roles (e.g., Troops to Teachers in
England, or routes permitting teaching assistants to qualify as teachers). Traditional teacher-preparation
programmes tend to emphasise pre-service training on the assumption that the learning and practical
experiences that trainees engage with will give them the requisite skills and knowledge needed for
success in the classroom. Alternative programmes may try to reduce barriers to entry and/or aim to
enable teachers to enter the classroom more quickly (e.g., Teach First, School Centred Initial Teacher
Training programme in the UK; Teach for America, the Teacher Residency Programs and Peace Corps
Program in the US).
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Many studies have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of different teacher preparation
routes, but most focus on outcomes relating to teacher performance with mixed results [47,48]. Typically,
these studies assess the relationship between certain attributes and qualifications of teachers and
teacher performance (usually measured using students’ performance as a proxy). There has been less
research on the effects of teacher preparation for teacher recruitment or retention.
2.1.3. Induction Programmes and Mentoring
In recent years, there has been growing policy interest in induction and mentoring strategies.
These are designed to provide additional support and development for teachers, usually in the early
years of their career, with a view to retaining them within the profession [49,50]. While there is a large
body of research on mentoring/induction programmes that has purportedly examined the “impact” of
induction and mentoring on teacher retention, most are limited to single-group causal comparative
analysis, correlating teachers’ participation in these programmes with their self-reported intention
to stay in teaching [51]. A systematic review on the role of mentors on retention of newly qualified
teachers could not find conclusive evidence of a positive impact [52]. Only three studies within
the review reported positive effects, but all were correlational studies (not based on experimental
designs). The report called for closer scrutiny of the relationship between induction and retention and
highlighted the need for more robust and reliable research in this area. Moreover, given the often
complex or multi-faceted nature of induction/mentoring programmes, it can sometimes be difficult to
understand which of the mechanisms or ‘ingredients’ within them are likely to drive any impact on
retention. Further high-quality research focusing on these areas is particularly needed at present in
order to inform the development and implementation of new policies on induction and mentoring
(see e.g., the Early Career Framework in England [28]
2.1.4. Professional Development
Investing in high-quality professional development is widely believed to be an effective way of
improving both teachers’ and, in turn, students’ performance [53]. More recently, however, professional
development is also being considered as a method for improving teachers’ satisfaction with their
job and potentially reducing their workload. This, it is hoped, may lead to increased retention [54].
There are numerous professional development opportunities available to schools and teachers at
present. However, there is considerable variation in the aims and quality of such programmes and
teachers’ access and engagement with them. Further, there is very little robust evidence which
points towards an impact on retention [55,56]. A study by Allen and Sims [57] in England indicated
that high-quality subject-specific professional development may be beneficial for retaining teachers.
The study examined teachers’ engagement with the National STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering
and Mathematics) Learning Network development scheme, finding that while participants were no
more likely to stay at their current school, they were more likely to stay in the profession for the
first and second year after taking the courses. Recent analyses by Worth and van den Brande [58]
found an association between teachers’ reported autonomy over their professional development and
their intention to stay in teaching. While not established as a causal relationship, this finding does
suggest that some experimental work on this issue would be helpful for understanding whether
increasing teachers’ autonomy in relation to professional development might be a potential strategy
for improving retention.
2.1.5. Leadership Support
Some studies have highlighted the importance of school environment factors for teacher retention,
with school leadership often being viewed as influential in determining the ethos and working
conditions within a school. A series of observational studies point to teachers’ perceptions of
administrative support and leadership as being strong predictors of teachers’ intention to leave [59–61].
Johnson, Kraft and Papay [62] argue that while working conditions generally appear to be important to
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teachers and their future career plans, it is the social conditions which form part of these—such as the
principal’s leadership, school culture and relationships with colleagues—which are most influential.
Analysis in England, based upon the international TALIS dataset, also highlights the importance of
good leadership. Sims [63] found that better school leadership is associated with higher job satisfaction
for teachers and a reduction in the odds that they would want to leave their school.
2.1.6. Additional Incentives
In addition to the financial incentives noted above and school working conditions, research has
looked at other incentives to encourage teacher recruitment and/or retention, including offering below
market rental rates, living allowances (e.g., London living allowances) and discounted housing in
certain areas. Examples from Australia and America include housing subsidies or offering rental
accommodation at below-market rate for teachers willing to work in rural areas [64]. Unfortunately,
the evidence on these kinds of incentives is limited and is often based on small-scale descriptive work
or tangential research about wider compensation. Unlike for more direct financial incentives and wage
compensation, there have been no rigorous evaluations of housing incentives to determine if they
work in improving recruitment and retention especially in hard-to-staff areas, as Anne Podolsky at the
Learning Policy Institute acknowledged [64].
2.2. Previous Reviews of the Literature
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no large-scale comprehensive reviews on teacher
recruitment and retention policies, with quality appraisal of individual studies included as a key feature.
Most have been narrative reviews of available literature [65,66] or focused on particular issues or
groups of teachers/schools. Przygocki [67], for example, looked specifically at teacher supply issues in
Catholic schools, while Fore et al. [68] and Billingsley [69] were concerned with the shortage of special
education teachers. Previous reviews have also tended not to be systematic, instead summarising a
collection of studies seeking the consensus view [70,71] or providing a discussion of a small number of
key articles [72–74]. Borman and Dowling’s [75] comprehensive review focused on the factors that
moderate attrition outcomes rather than examining policy initiatives or interventions designed to
improve retention.
A review by Guarino et al. [76] examined the individual and school characteristics linked to
teacher recruitment and retention, as well as synthesising the evidence for a range of policies and
initiatives aiming to reduce the shortage. The authors apply four quality criteria based on sample,
measurement procedures, model specification and interpretation to these studies. These quality
criteria, however, were used to determine whether studies would be included in the review or not.
They were not used to assess the weight that should be allocated to the findings in relation to each
intervention. More recently, Hanover Research’s review [77] examined both financial and workplace
incentives connected to teacher recruitment and retention. However, the study provides little critical
analysis nor consideration of the quality of each of the included evaluations. Gunther [78] examined
non-financial factors influencing teacher recruitment and retention, including a range of research
design and quality criteria used for rating of included studies. However, the study focused on personal,
school, community and job characteristics or factors, rather than examining the effectiveness of policy
interventions introduced to tackle the teacher shortage.
Where attempts have been made to consider the quality of the included studies the results have
been disappointing. Laurence et al.’s [79] review of programmes aimed at attracting and retaining
teachers in the US concluded that it was difficult to be certain about the evidence of effectiveness
as many of the programmes tended to be small and piecemeal and hence difficult to replicate on
a large-scale. Lonsdale and Ingvarson [80] reviewed recruitment strategies employed in Australia,
the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand and cautioned that many of the strategies have not been formally
evaluated, or where they have, evidence tended to be anecdotal and informal.
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Our review exclusively includes studies that can contribute to answering causal questions on the
impact of strategies or policy initiatives to improve the recruitment and retention of teachers.
3. Methods
This review summarises the evidence of initiatives in addressing teacher recruitment and retention.
Knowing more about what ‘works’ and what does not will allow policymakers and schools to make
informed and targeted decisions on strategies to use or avoid, to attract and retain teachers. Given the
huge amount of research in this area, we have to be careful these decisions are supported by the
best available evidence. It is therefore imperative that the trustworthiness of each research finding is
evaluated. To do this we used a multi-factor method for judging the quality of evidence of each study
included in the review.
The research questions are:
1. What are the most promising approaches in attracting teachers into the profession?
2. What are the most promising approaches in retaining teachers into the profession?
3. What are the ‘best bets’ for schools, regions, and policymakers to improve the recruitment and
retention of school teachers?
In the context of this review, teachers refer to classroom teachers who deliver teaching in
state-funded schools from early years to post-secondary education. We have intentionally not limited
ourselves to teachers of any phase or subjects as attracting and retaining different types of teachers
may require different strategies. In any case, the majority of research conducted in this area focused on
teachers in state-funded schools, with a small number covering special education teachers. There was
also a disproportionate number about shortage subjects, such as maths and science or languages.
This is not surprising as recruiting and retaining shortage subject teachers has been a concern in most
education systems across the world.
3.1. Search Strategy
To search for relevant studies, a list of search terms was developed as follows:
Teacher supply OR teacher demand OR teacher retention OR teacher shortage OR teacher recruitment
AND initiative OR incentive* OR policy/scheme AND experiment OR quasi-experiment OR
randomised control* trial RCT OR regression discontinuity OR difference in difference OR time series
OR longitudinal OR systematic review OR review OR meta-analys* AND impact OR evaluation
OR effect.
These were applied to 13 educational, psychological and sociological electronic databases including:
• Education Resources Information Clearinghouse
• JSTOR
• The Scholarly Journal Archive
• Social Sciences and Education Full Text
• Web of Science
• Sage
• Science Direct
• Proquest Dissertations and Theses
• British Education Index
• ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center)
• IBSS (International Bibliography of the Social Sciences)
• Ingenta Journals (full text of a large number of journals)
• EBSCOhost (which covers the following databases: PsychINFO, BEI, PsycARTICLES, etc,
ProQuest, IBSS
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• Plus Google and Google Scholar.
These searches were supplemented by studies known to us and snowballing of relevant studies
cited in the retrieved studies and from prior reviews of the literature.
The search terms were tested on well-known sociological, educational and psychological databases
to ensure that they picked up relevant pieces of literature, and pieces already known on this topic.
Following this, a very general and inclusive statement of search terms was generated for each database.
These were adjusted to suit the idiosyncrasies of each.
To determine the causal evidence of policies and initiatives on teacher recruitment and retention,
we included only studies using experimental (e.g., randomised control studies) or quasi-experimental
designs (e.g., regression discontinuity, matched comparison, difference-in-difference, longitudinal
time-series analysis and instrumental variables) and large-scale longitudinal studies, or similar.
The scoping review and previous reviews of literature suggested that there were few robust
experimental evaluations of policy initiatives or approaches for teacher recruitment and retention.
The decision was therefore made to include any empirical studies with at least some type of comparative
design, but would have low ratings for trustworthiness in terms of causal claims.
The search was limited to studies published or reported in the English language. We intentionally
did not set any date limits, to keep the search open. To avoid publication bias, the search included any
material published or unpublished that mentions both substantive and causal terms.
A total of 6731 potentially relevant records were identified from titles alone. An additional
347 were added from following studies in previous reviews, studies known to us from previous work
and from references in identified studies. These included 58 research reports from ProQuest Premium
which were specifically related to the effects of induction and mentoring on teacher retention. All were
exported to EndNote (a reference manager) for screening.
3.2. Screening
In any review, a broad search of the databases will invariably pick up huge numbers of irrelevant
materials. This is even more so in our case as we intentionally kept the search as broad and
comprehensive as necessary to ensure that we did not miss potentially relevant materials. A large
majority of records were not relevant but contained some of the keywords. To remove these,
we eyeballed the entries looking at the title and abstracts and removed those that were clearly not
relevant to the topic. We then screened for duplicates using the EndNote function. Some studies were
presented in different forms, or for different audiences, e.g., as a working paper or a report as well as
journal articles. These were treated as one study.
In the next stage of screening the full reports were skim-read by one researcher. Any studies
thought not to meet the inclusion criteria were then reviewed by other members of the research team
for consensus. Four members of the team independently reviewed 10 randomly selected reports to
agree on their inclusion or exclusion. The full texts of the included studies were screened by applying
pre-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria as presented below.
3.3. Inclusion Criteria
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were determined prior to completing the searches and were
applied after the initial screenings. Studies were included if they were:
1. Empirical research
2. About activities aimed at attracting people into teaching or about retaining teachers in teaching
3. Specifically about recruitment and/or retention of classroom teachers
4. About incentives/initiatives/policies or schemes on teacher recruitment and retention
5. About mainstream teachers in state-funded/government schools
6. Studies that had measurable outcomes (either retention or recruitment)
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3.4. Exclusion Criteria
Studies were excluded if they were:
1. Not relevant to the research questions
2. Not primary research
3. Not reported in English
4. Not a report of research
5. Descriptions of programmes or initiatives with no evaluation of strategies or approaches used in
teacher recruitment and retention
6. Not about strategies or approaches to improve recruitment or retention of teachers (e.g.,
observational or correlational studies of factors influencing recruitment and retention)
7. Studies that had no clear evaluation of outcomes
8. Studies with non-tangible or measurable outcomes (e.g., surveys about teachers’ attitude or
beliefs or perceptions
9. Ethnographic studies, narrative case studies, opinion pieces
10. Outcome is not teacher recruitment or retention
11. Focus only on specific groups of teachers, e.g., special education teachers or ethnic
minority teachers
12. Not relevant to the context of English speaking developed countries
13. Recruitment and retention of school leaders, teaching assistants or school administrators
14. Anecdotal accounts from schools about successful strategies
15. Surveys collecting ideas about the best way or most effective ways to attract and retain teachers
The PRISMA diagram (Figure 1) tracks the number of studies included and excluded at each stage
of the review process.
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The majority of the studies that were excluded were because they were not relevant to the topic
(i.e., not about teacher recruitment and retention), not about impact evaluation, recruitment and
retention were not the outcomes, or were simply reports about best practices.
3.5. Data Extraction
The included studies were assembled and considered for synthesis. Key information from each of
the included studies was extracted and summarised using a template (Appendix A). Such information
included the research design, sample size, group allocation, outcome measures, missing data, methods
of analysis and the results.
We then judged the research evidence and reliability of the finding for each piece of included
study using the “Gorard Sieve” [81]. This uses five criteria to assess the trustworthiness of the research
(see Appendix B): the design (whether it includes a fair counterfactual), scale of study (size of smallest
cell, as small studies can be volatile and vulnerable to threats to validity), scale of missing data (missing
data can bias the findings), quality of data obtained (data obtained from standardized test instruments
or administrative data are considered more robust than data collected from participants’ self-report or
from instruments aligned with the intervention) and other threats to validity (e.g., conflicts of interest).
All such factors are important [82] for ensuring that the evidence that informs policy and practice can
be relied upon. Each study was then given a padlock rating ranging from 0 (no weight can be placed on
the study) to 4
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for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
(the most robust that could be expected in reality). This is an indication of how secure
the findings are. We use the term “quality” to refer to the security of the findings and not necessarily the
quality f the research. The ratings take no account of whether the intervention was deemed successful
or not, or whether the repor author claimed the int rven ion was effective. To ensure inter-rater
reliab lity, four members of the team reviewed and rated a sample of five papers. Team members were
i co stant co sultations with each other throughout the process to ensure consistency.
We did n t c mpute the ave a e effect sizes for each of the approaches as the study designs were
o varied that averaging effect sizes across different studies which use different scales (e.g., odds ratios,
hazard isks, mean effe t sizes nd r-coefficie ts) for measuring different aspects of similar intervention
may not reflect the real impact of each i ividual type of programme. To illustrate, the studies in
this review employ a range of methodologies (e.g., instrumental variables, regression discontinuity,
im -series analysis, difference-in-difference and randomis d control trials) to estimate the effects of a
wide spectrum of measures aim d at improving teacher supply. One of these is financial incentives.
This is an umbrella term which encomp sses diff rential salary compensation, bonus incentive scheme,
ension enhancement, scholarship and bursaries and tuition fee waivers. These strategies are not
identical, or even similar n some c ses, therefore aver gi g the effect sizes across the different strategies
may not reflect the imp ct of each particular strategy. It is also the case in this review that there were
often o ly one or two s udies for each type of fi ancial incentive that meet our causal criteria. It was
therefore not p ssible or desirable to average the effect size for each type of programme [83].
The k y matter is whether the effect is positive or not. The size of the effect can be misleading as
studies wit small samples, those without control groups, used non-randomised controls and those
that are b d on t ac rs’/pupils’ self-r ports of outcomes invariably show huge effect sizes [83].
To overcome these probl ms, we xamined the subst ntive and methodological features of each study
using the “sieve”. Therefore, rather than reporting effect sizes, we present the direction of effect
(positive, negative or no change) and the strength of the evidence (i.e., how secure is the finding).
3.6. Synthesising the Evidence
To facilitate the synthesis, we sorted the research reports by outcomes according to whether
they were about recruitment, retention or both. A broad classification of incentives/initiatives was
created. These include financial incentives (e.g., signing bonuses, wage uplifts, scholarships and loans),
and other non-financial incentives (e.g., alternative routes into teaching, staff development, mentoring
& induction and workload reduction) or a combination.
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 10 of 45
Approaches with the most highly rated studies showing positive effects are considered the most
promising. Likewise, approaches rated highly (i.e., 2
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in T nne see during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
and above) showing egative or o effects are
considered least promising given the existing evid nce. All outcomes, whether positive or negative are
considered. It is just as impor a t to identify approaches that do not have evidence of eff ctiveness
as it is to identify th se th t do work. It has to b made clear that approache with no vide c of
impac does not mean that they are not effective, but rather that the existing vidence is such that its
effectivene s cannot b determined.
4. Results
The 120 included studies reported 157 individual outcomes relevant to recruitment and retention
(Table 1). We discuss the approaches for improving recruitment and retention separately. However,
a number of studies report on both recruitment and retention and these are included in both sections
where appropriate. Studies receiving a 0
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are hi h performing te chers who can 
easily find better paid jobs lsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] valuated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teach rs in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high overty, high mi rity schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teach rs in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study usi g a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tenn ssee’s online teacher evaluation platfor , CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised f r the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee du ing the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evid nc  studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the co mitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the progra  as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided perfor ance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a sm ll award rather th n no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large a a d were l ss likely than teachers who received a sm ll award to be retained 
in the district. P rh ps teachers in receipt of a large award are high p rforming teachers who can 
easily find better pai  jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluat d the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers i  Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, h gh minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus ince tiv  increased e retention of teacher  in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Educ tion nd Training) teacher . This was a quasi-
experimental study usin  a r gression d scontinuity d sign exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
over ll evaluatio  rating that det rmines eligibility for he retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level econo ic data nd data 
from the TVAAS a  Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE ( ont ins v lu -ad ed 
estimat s for teacher ) w re utilised for the analysis. The sa ple i cluded all teache s working in 
Priority Sch ol  i  Tennessee during the 2–2013 school year. 
Three m der t ly high evid nce studies (3🔒) found no effect of fina ial incentives on teacher 
retention. Stee e et al. [89] evaluated th  G vernor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the co mitment. There was no difference i  retention 
rates (75% ver four years) between recipient a d non-recipients, despite the pen lty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference pproach, Clotf lter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the impleme tation of the bonus programme; eligible and neligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
d scontinuity design. T is is the North C roli a bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academical y challenging schools. Under t is scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual b nus of $1800 if they aught in an eligible school, and will con inue to 
receive the bonus as long as hey stayed in th ame school and aught th am  subjects. Overall, the 
re lts uggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce tu nov r rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is b cause the $1800 bonus was not large en ugh or is it b caus there w s a flaw in the 
design and impleme tation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses f om rincipals and teachers in icated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to ret in teachers. They uggested that administrative support, improving s hool c ditions 
nd facilitating pr fessional develop ent might b  better options. Comparison was made with 
teacher  across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% l ss likely to leav  at the end 
of t e school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
co trolling for subject aught. A 10% inc ase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fix d effects in th  regression the effect was n gative. 
In a cluster randomised control t ial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both a  ntention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons uggested 
for the nil effect includ d incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-bas d incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a l p sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Sch o s coul  decide to award a subs t of teachers wit  t e highest 
valu -added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority f schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on s udents nd teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
7–2008 t rough 09–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to he intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity o participate. 
rating are n t discussed in ny further detail s their
limited d sign or methodological quality means t at they ffer ittle in terms of indicating promising
(or otherwise) approaches. Appendix C summar ses the weak r tudies (rated 0
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teach rs who received a sm ll award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award wer  less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in th  district. Perhaps teache s i rec ipt of a large ward are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs lsewhere. 
Sp ing r, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluate  the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
eff ctive teachers n Te nessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
h wed tha the bonus i c ntive creased he retentio of teacher in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
xperimental study using a regression disconti ui y design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
ov rall v luation r ting that det rmi es eligibility for the  bonus in participating schools. 
Nati nally represent tive administrative ta sup l m ted by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online t acher evaluation pla f rm, CODE (contains value-added 
estim tes f  teachers) wer  utilised for the a alys s. The sample ncluded all teachers working in 
Pri rity School  in nn ssee during th  2012–2013 school year. 
Thre  od ately high evidenc  stu ies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluat d the Governo ’s T aching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 ncentiv  to attract new achers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
ea h of the fi st four year that th y did not meet the mit ent. There was no difference in retention 
rat s (75% over four years) between recipi nt and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Us ng a ifference-in- ifference-i -difference app oach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard ates before a d after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in t e same scho ls usi g a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discon inuity desig . This s th  North C rolin  bonus inc ntive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subject  i  high poverty or academically ch llenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
w re eligible f r an an ual bonu of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the b nus as long a  they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest t at the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this i becaus  the $1800 bonus was not large e ough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implemen ation f the program as ot all teacher who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principal  and teacher ind cated t at the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enoug  t  retain teachers. They sugg sted hat a ministrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers ross ligibl chool  and those in s ho ls that nar owly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The result s owed that r ceiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school y ar compared to ther teacher  in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controll ng for subj ct taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
p ints. However, this r flect  a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the l fixe  effects  regression the effect was negative. 
I  a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
sc e e that pr vided performanc  b nuses to scho l taff ba ed on their schools’ progress report. 
U i g oth an int nti -to- reat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treate analyses, the results showed that 
th  t acher pe form nce bonus prog am had no effect o  teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil eff ct included incentives not being large enough, inc ntive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives ma  n t be effectiv . Pa ticipating school  were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union te cher. Schools could ecide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among acher  by lottery. Th  majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and t achers from 396 high-nee public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 t r ugh 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of ov rty. Of th s  schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
c mparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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te ch s who received  small wa d r ther than no award. However, this stu y found t at teachers 
who received  large award were less likely than teache s who received  small award o b  retained 
in th  district. P rhaps teach rs in recei t of  large wa d are high performing teachers who can 
asil  find better pa d jobs elsewh . 
Spri ger, Swain and Rodriquez [99] valu te  the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
ff ctive teach s in T nness e’  Priority School (high poverty, high minority school ). The study 
showed that the bonus incentiv increas d th  retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
no  the retentio f Level 5 (Diplo   Education d Training) teac ers. This was a quasi-
ex eri ental tudy using a regre sion discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
o r ll evaluation r ting that d termi es e igibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representativ  dministr tiv  data upplemented b  county-level e onomic at  nd data 
fro  the TVAAS a d T nnessee’s online t acher evalu  platform, CODE (contains value-added 
timat s r t chers) were utilised for the an lysis. T  sample includ d all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in T nness e during th  2012–2013 school year. 
Thr e mod rately high vid nc studies (3🔒) f und n  e fect of financial ince tives on teacher 
ret ntion. Ste le et al. [89] valu ted the Gov rnor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 in e tive to attract n w te ch rs to low-p rforming schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
a h of the first f ur y ar tha  they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over fou  years) b tween r cipient and on-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-diff renc -in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
h zard rat before and after h  implem nta on of t  b nus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the ame chools us ng a hybrid of a ran omiz d experiment and a regression 
discontinuity des gn. Thi  is e N rth Carolina b us incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high pov rty or a de ically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an an al bonus of $1800 if they taught n an eligible school, and will continue to 
receiv the bonus l ng s they stay d in the same school and taught the same subjects. Ov rall, the 
result  sugg st that t bonus ncentive did not r duce tu nover rates. However, it is not clear 
w ether this i  be use e $18 0 bonus wa  not lar e enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
esig  and implementation of the program as no  all teachers who wer  eligib e actually received the 
bonus. Survey resp nses from principal and t achers indicated that the $1800 b us alo e was not 
e ough o retai  teacher . They suggest tha  administrative support, mproving school conditions 
and facilitating p ofessional d ve opment migh  be better options. Compari on was made with 
teachers across eligible sch ols and thos  in sch ols that narrowly missed out based on t e threshold 
eligibility. The results sh wed t at tea hers receivi g a bonus were 15% less likely to leav  at the end 
of the school yea  com ared to other t achers in the same sc ool. This increased to 17% after 
c r lling for subj c  tau ht. A 10% increas  reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
p ints. However, thi reflects a pattern already in place even b fo e the programme was introduced. 
In luding the chool ixed effects in the regre sion the effect was negative. 
In a clust r ran omi d control trial, Fry r [102] x mined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provid d performa ce bonu es to school aff based on their sch ols’ progress report. 
Using b h an int tion-to-treat (ITT) and reatme t-of- he-tre ted analys , the results showed that 
th  te cher performance b nus progr m had n  eff ct on teacher retention. Some reason  suggested 
f r th nil effect includ d inc ntiv  not being lar  enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be ffective. Parti ipating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 er full unio  teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-add d or divide among teache s b lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data o  tude s and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were alysed. Scho ls were selected based on some criteria, .g., level 
of poverty. Of t ese schools, 233 w re randomly assigned to th  intervention group and 163 to the 
omparison group. Retenti n outcomes in schools that were offered partic pation in the program—
ev n if they ultimately eclined to participat —were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
). Thes are
mainly st dies with very weak design. Th y ither had very small s mpl s, no - a domly allo ated
compa is n gr ps, had no cl ar comparators, high iti or based on mod l that made a number
of unrealistic assumptions. All this makes t difficult to ttribute the eff ct to the p licy nitiative or
in rvention. Th refore, including the i h discussion will dd little to th overall find g.
Table 1. umber of studies with each security rati g: all included studies.
Security Rating Positive Outcomen = 92
Unclear/Mixed Outcome
n = 15
Neutral or Negative Outcome
n = 50
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) fo nd no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible an  ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bon s incentive aimed at retaining qualifie  teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not red ce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this udy f  that teac ers
who received a large award were less likely than teach rs who receive  a small awar  to be retaine  
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing te chers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsew ere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated th  US$5000 retentio  b us progr m for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority scho ls). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increase  the reten ion of te chers i  test d subjects and grades, bu  
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Trai ing) te chers. This w s quasi-
experimental study using a regression disco tinuity design expl iting the sharp c t- ff i   te cher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines ligibility for th  retention bonus in participating scho l . 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by c unty-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evalu tion platform, CODE (cont ins value- d d 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the an lysis. The sampl  inclu e  all teachers w rki g in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 sc ool year. 
Three moderately high evidence tudies (3🔒) found no ffect of fin ial incentives on t cher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) schem , involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teac ers to l w-perfo ming chools. Teac ers h d to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitme t. Ther  wa  no diff r ce i  r t tion 
rates (75% over four years) between re ipient and non-re ipie ts, de pite th  penalty cl use. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelt  t l. [100,101] compar  
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus pr gr mm ; eligibl  and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of  randomized experi nt an  a regressi n 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus in entive aimed at r tai ing qualified t ch s 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging sc ols. Und  this scheme t achers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they tau ht in a  eligible scho l, and will co tinue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same scho l and taught th  sam  s bjects. Overall, th  
results suggest that the bonus i centive did t reduce turnover rates. However, it i  not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not l rg  eno gh or i  it bec use t re was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the pr gram as not all teachers who were eli i le actually received th  
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teach rs indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school con itions 
and facilitating professional dev lopm nt might be better ptions. C mp rison was de with 
teachers across eligible schools nd those i  chools that narrowly missed out based on th  thr sh ld 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receivin  a bonus w re 15% less likely to l ave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teacher  in the ame school. This increased to 17% aft  
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the pr bability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a patt rn already in place ven before the rogramm  a  int o uced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the reg ssion the ffect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wid  performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their sch ols’ pr gress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a small award rath r than no award. However, this study f und that t achers 
who received a large award were less lik ly tha  teache s w o r ceiv d a small a ard t  be ret in d 
in the district. Perhaps teach rs in rec ipt of a large aw rd are high p rforming teachers who c n 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retentio  b nus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Scho ls (high p verty, high inority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased t e retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a qu si-
experimental study using a regression discontin ity design expl iting the sh rp cut-off i   t acher’s 
overall evaluation rating that d t rmin s eligibility for the retention b nus i  participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrativ  data supplemented by county-lev l economic d ta and dat  
from the TVAAS and Tenness e’s online t acher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value- dded 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. Th  sample included all teachers working i  
Priority Schools in Tennessee uring the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives o  teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teac ing Fellowship (GTF) sche e, i volving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers ad to re a  $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitme t. T ere was n  difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite t e pe alty cla se. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementati n of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment a d a regressi n 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retai ing qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this sche e teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in a  eligible sch ol, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same sch l and taught the sa e s bjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turn ver rates. However, it is ot clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because t ere was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the rogram as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that t e $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They s ggeste  that administrative support, im roving scho l conditio s 
and facilitating professional development might be better ptions. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools t at narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% i crease reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even bef re the rogra me was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who r ceived a small awa d ather than no award. However, this study found that t achers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who r ceived a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award a e high performing teacher  who can 
asily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Ro riquez [99] evaluated t  US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teacher  i  Tennessee’s P iority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bo us incentiv  increas d the ret ntion of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Lev l 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study usi g a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating t at determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally r presentative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and dat  
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher valuation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
stimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers worki g i  
Priority Schools in Tennessee duri g the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three mo erat ly high evid  stu ies (3🔒) found no effect of financi l incentives on teacher 
retention. Steel  et al. [89] evaluated th  Govern r’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attra t new teachers to low-performing schools. T achers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipie ts, despite the penalty claus . 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and fter the implementation of the bonus programme; ligible and ineligibl  
t achers in the s me school  using a hybrid of a randomiz d experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Caroli a bonus i centive aimed at retaining qu lified teachers 
in targete  subjects i  high poverty or academically ch llenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligibl  for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stay d in t e s me school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not r duce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this i  because the $1800 bonu  was not large enough or is it b cause there was a flaw in the 
design and impl mentation of t e program as not all teacher  ho were eligible actually r ceived the 
bonus. Survey r sponses from principals and teachers indicated t at the $1800 bonus al ne was not 
enough to retain teachers. T ey suggested that admini trative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be b tt r options. Comparison  made with 
teachers acros  eligible schools and those in sch ols that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers rec iving a bonus were 15% less lik ly to leave at the end 
of the sc ool year compared to other teacher  in the same sch ol. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% i crease reduces t  probability of teache s leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this r flects a atte n already in place even befo  the progra me was introduced. 
Includi g the school fixed eff cts in the regression the effect was egative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Frye  [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performan e bonuses to school st ff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher p rformance bonus program had o effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentiv s ot b ing large enough, in entive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be ffective. Participating schools w e give  a lump sum incentiv  
on $3000 per full union teacher. S hool  could decide to award a subset of te chers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teac rs wh  rec ived  small award rath r th  no award. Howev r, this study found tha  teachers 
who rec ived  larg  awar  w r  less l kely tha  teach rs who receiv d a smal  award to be retain  
in e istric . Per aps te ch rs in r c p  of  larg  award are high performing teachers who can 
easily f d be t r p d job  els w ere. 
Springer, Sw i   Rodr quez [99] ev uated th  US$5000 r tention bon s progr m for 
effective e ch rs in Tenness e’s Pri ity Scho ls (high pov rty, hi h minority schools). The study 
showed tha  the bo us inc ntive inc eas d the r t n i n of teach rs in t sted subjects and grades, but 
n t th  retentio  of Level 5 (Diplom  in E ucation and Training) teac ers. This was a quasi-
experimenta  udy u ing  reg essio  dis ontinui y esign expl iting th  sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overal  valuatio  rat g t t et rmines eligi i ity for the r t t on nus in pa ticipating schoo s. 
Nat o ally repres tativ  admin strati  data supplemented by unty-l vel economic data nd ata 
fr m the TVAAS and T nnessee’s nli e t c er ev luati n platform, CODE (contains value- dded 
estimat s for tea her ) w e utilised for the lysis. The sa ple included all teachers w rking in 
Priority Schools  Tennessee uring th  2012–2013 school y ar. 
Thr  mod r tely hig  evidence studie  (3🔒) found no effect of financ al incentives on t acher 
r tent on. S e et l. [89] evaluated the Gov rno ’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) schem , involving a
$20,000 i cent ve t attract n w t chers o lo -p rforming sc ools. Tea ers had to repay $5000 or 
eac  of the fi st four y ar that hey did not meet the commitment. There w s no dif erence in r tention 
r tes (75% ov four y ars) be we n recipi nt and n n-r cipients, despite the penalty claus . 
Using a differenc -in-diff r nce-in-diff rence approach, Cl tfel er et l. [100,101] compared 
h zard rat s b for  and aft r the implem nta on f the bonus programme; eligible and in ligible 
tea hers in the s me sch ols using a hy rid of a r nd mized expe iment and a reg ession 
di continu ty desi . This is North Carolin  b us inc tive aimed at r taining q alifi d teachers 
in targeted subje ts i  high p v rty or academically challenging schools. Under this schem  teachers 
were ligible for an nnual bo us of $1800 if they taught in a  lig ble school, and will continue to 
receiv  the bonus as long as they taye in he s me school a d taught the same subj ct . Overall, the 
results sugg st that th  bonus incent ve did not re uce tu n ver ates. However,  is not clear
wh ther this is b caus th  $1800 b us was not l g enou h or i  it because there was a flaw in the 
design  i plementatio  of th  pr gra  as not all teach rs who wer  eligible actually received the 
b us. Survey responses f om p inci s and eachers indicat d that th  $1800 bonu  alone was not 
enough to r tain t achers. Th y suggest d that administrative support, impr ving school conditions 
nd f cilit ting professional d velopme t ight be better ptions. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible sch o s and those in schools that narrowly m ss  ou  bas d on the thre hold 
eligibility. The results howed hat eachers receiv ng a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of th  sc ool year c mpared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. Ho ever, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a luster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided p rformance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
th  teacher perform nce bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-b sed incentives m y not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
and b v (T ble 2).
All but tw involve some kin of financi l incen ives (T le 3). This is p rhaps b cause large-scale
administrative/panel at r lating to fin cial inc tives ar e r adily av ilable and c s ible,
and fficient to xamine for re earc r .
Table 2. Security ratings of tudies on ecruitment.
Security Rating Positive Outcome Unclear/MixedOut me
Neutral or Negative
Outcome
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teachers w  received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a larg  award were less likely than teachers who r eived a sm l award to be ret ined
in the district. P rhaps teachers in rec ipt of a large award ar  high performing t achers who can
easily find be ter paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springe , Swain nd Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for
eff ctive teachers in T nnessee’s Priority Schools (high pov rty, high minority schoo s). The study 
showed that the bonus incentiv  incr ase  th  retention of teachers in sted subjects and grades, but
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Trainin ) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regres on discontinuity desig  exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the ret ntion bonus in participat ng schools.
Nationally repr sentative administrative data supple ented by county-level economi  data and data
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’ nline teacher ev luatio  platform, CODE (co tains value-added
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Th ee moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of fin ncial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s T ing Fello ship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentiv  to attract new tea hers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 f r 
ach of the first four yea  that they did not mee  the co mitm nt. There was n  difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) betwe n recipient and non-r cipients, de pite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelt r et al. [100,101] co pare  
hazard rates before and aft r e implementation of the bonus programme; eligible nd ineligible 
teac r  in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment an  a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Ca olina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qu lified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teach rs 
were eli ible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and ill continue to 
receive the bonus s long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the b nus incentive did not reduce turnover rat s. However, it is not clear 
whether is is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it becau e the  wa  a flaw in the 
design and imple entation of the program as not all teachers who w re eligible actu lly received he 
bonus. Survey respons s from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus al ne was not 
en gh to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school co ditions 
a d facilitating professional development might b  better options. C mp rison as ade with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that na rowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers rec iving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% aft r 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of eachers leaving by 1–4% 
p ints. H wever, this r flects a pattern already in place even be o  the progr mme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression th  effect was negative. 
I  a clust r randomised con rol t ial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received  small award rather th  no award. How v r, his study f und that t ach r  
who received a larg  award were l ss lik ly t a t achers w o re eived  sm ll awa d to reta n  
in the district. Pe haps teachers in receipt of a large awar  are high p rformi  teac r who ca  
easily fi d bett r paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swai  and Ro riquez [99] evaluated th  US$5000 entio  b n s prog m for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority scho ls). Th study
show d that the bonus incentive increased t e ret ntion f t ch rs i  t ste  subject  and gr des, bu  
not the r tention of Level 5 (Diploma i Educatio  and Training) t chers. This was qu si-
experimental tudy sing a regr ssio  discontinuity design expl iting t  sharp cut- in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines el gibility for t e retention o us i  participati g sc ools. 
Natio lly representative ad inistrativ  ata suppl me t d by c unty-l vel conom  data and data
fr m t e TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teach r evalu tion platf rm, CODE (contains valu - dd d
stimates for teachers) were uti is d for the n lysis. The sampl  included all ach rs w rking in
Priority Sch ols in Tennessee uring the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three mo erately high evidence stu ie  (3🔒) found no eff ct of financial incentiv s n t acher 
retention. Ste le et al. [89] evaluated the Gov rnor’  Teaching F llowship (GTF) scheme, involv g a 
$20,000 incentiv  to attract new teac rs o l w-performing scho ls. Teac ers had t  re ay $5000 fo  
each f the first four year that they did not me t the commitm n . The e w s n  differ nce in t nt on
rates (75% over four years) betwe n cipi nt and non-r ci ents, despite th  pe alty claus . 
Using a difference-in-differe ce-in-difference approach, Clotfel er t al. [100,101] co pared 
hazard rates b fore and after the implementation of the bonus programme; ligibl and ineligible 
teachers in the same sch ols using a hybrid of a r ndomized experiment and a regr ssion 
di continuity design. This is the North Carolina bo us incen ive aimed at r taining q alified teac ers 
in targete  subjects in high poverty or academically hallenging schools. Under this scheme tea hers 
were ligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in a  ligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bo us as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same s bject . Overall, th  
results suggest that the bonus incentive di  not r duce turnover ra s. How ver, it is not cl ar 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not larg  enough or is it because t ere was a flaw in the 
design and implemen ation of the program as not all tea hers ho were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from princip ls and teachers indicat d that the $1800 bonus alon  was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving s hool conditio s 
and f cilitating professional developme t might be better ptions. Com rison as mad  with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the thre hold 
eligibility. The results showed tha  teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to le ve at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of t achers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the progra me was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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Table 3. Security ratings of studies on financial incentives in teacher recruitment.
Security Rating Positive Outcome Unclear/MixedOutcome
Neutral or Negative
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression d scontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers wo king in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately hig  vide c  studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the co mitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the i plementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus ere 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a small wa d rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were l ss likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tenness e’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using r gression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administr tive data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
fr m the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderat ly high vidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] e a uated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 inc ntive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that hey did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates b fore and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the s me schools usi g a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
d scontinui y design. This is he North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in igh poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bo s of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bo us incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whe her thi  is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain tea ers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating profession l development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
ligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the sc ool year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject tau ht. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster rando ised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that pr vided pe formance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the t acher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for th nil ffect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentive  may not be ffective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
D ta on students and tea ers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 w re randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if t y lti ately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
studies
are redominantly positive (Table 3). This sug ests that th re is promising, but far from definitive
evidenc that financial incentives ay be an effective stra egy in tt i g teachers in the profession
and o specific regi ns, subjects or hard-to-staff schools.
Th only study rated 3
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. Howeve , his study fo nd that teachers 
who r ceived a large award were less likely than teac ers who received a small award to be re ained 
in the district. Perhaps t achers in rec ipt of a large award are high p rforming teache s who an 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 r tention bonus program f r
effective teachers in Tennesse ’s Pr ority Schools (high poverty, high minor ty schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incent ve increased the retentio  of teachers i  t st d subjects and gra es, but 
not  retention of Lev l 5 (Diploma in Education a d Training) teachers. Thi was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design ex o ting th  sharp cut-off in a teach r’s 
overall evaluat on rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by ounty-l vel ec nomic data an  data 
from the TVAAS nd Tennessee’s online teache  evaluat on platform, CODE (contains value- dded 
estimates for t ach rs) wer  u ilised for the a alysis. The s pl included all eachers working in 
Priority Schools in T nnes ee during the 2012–2013 sc ool year. 
Three moderately high evidenc  studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentive on teacher 
retention. Steele t al. [89] evaluated the Gover or’s Teaching Fellow hip (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attr c  new teachers to low-per orming sc ools. Te ch rs had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. T e was no differ nce in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipie t and non-r cipients, despite he penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfel r et al. [100,101] c mpa ed
hazard rat s before a d after the implemen ation of the bo us programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a ybrid of a randomized experiment and  regre sion 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targe ed su j ts in high poverty or ac demic lly challenging chools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus f $1800 if they taug t in an el ibl  schoo , and will ontinue t  
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the sam  chool n  taught the sam  ubject . Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonu  inc n ive did not reduce turnover rates. How ver, it is not clear 
whether th s is because the $1800 bonus was not large nough or is it bec use there was a flaw in e 
design nd implementati n of the pr gram as n t all teachers who were eligi l  actually received the 
bonus. Surv y responses from principals and teachers indicated that th  $1800 bonu  alone was not 
enough t  retain teachers. They suggest d t at administr tive support, improving school conditi ns 
a d facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison w s made with 
teachers across eligibl  schools nd those in schools that narrowly missed out bas d on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that eachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leav  at the end 
of the s hool year co pared to other teachers in the sam  school. Thi  incr ased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a patter  already in place even before the programme was intro uced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the eff ct was negative. 
I  a clus er ran omised control rial, Fryer [102] examin d a school-wide performanc  bo us 
scheme that provided performanc  bonuses to s hool staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-tre ted analyses, t  results s owed t at 
the teach r performance bonus program had no eff ct on teacher r tenti n. Some reasons suggest d 
for the nil effect i cluded incentives not bei g large enough, i centive cheme was too omplex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum inc ntive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the hig st 
value-added r divide am g teacher by lottery. The majority of schools o ted for grou  i cen ives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elem ntary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on som  criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
ruitment [84] evalu ted the impac of financial incentives on
recruitment ret ntion of shortage subject t ac ers. he results were m xed. The study utilised
ins rument l va iables model using data f m the Scho l and St ffi g Survey from 1999/2000 to
2007/2008 which con ained data fro 106,930 public sch ol teachers in 6540 public school districts.
This is perhaps t e l rgest stu y of its kind and s veral mo el were employ d wi in it. O e compared
teachers in districts that offered inc tives with matched teachers in oth di tricts. Th s does not
overcom the problem tha d stricts at did and did not off r such i ce tives may have other differences
that could influence teacher r cruitme t and ret nti n. There wa no clear evidence t at the use f
incentives i proved teacher recr itment or quali y. Incentives were most attra tive to those who were
already i terested in becoming t achers.
There were eight studies rated 2
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t achers who receiv d a small award rather than  award. How r, this study f und t a  teacher
who rec ived a la ge awar w re less likely th n eachers ho received a small award to b ret ined 
in the distric . P rhaps teac ers in receipt f a large award ar  igh perf rming t ach rs who can 
eas ly find better p id jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Ro riqu z [99] evaluat d th  US$5000 eten ion bonus prog am for 
effective teach rs in T nnesse ’s Priority Schools (hi h poverty, high minority s ho s). The study 
showed that the bon s incentive increased the r tention  teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not retention f Level 5 (Diploma in Educati n an Trai ing) teach rs. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regressio discont uity sign x loiting the sharp c t-off in a eacher’s 
over ll evaluat on at g that de er in s ligibility for the eten ion bonus in participating schools. 
N tionally represen ativ ad inistrativ  data suppleme te  by county-level eco m c data and data
from  TVAAS and Tennesse ’s online tea er evaluat on platfor , CODE (contains valu -added 
estimates for t acher ) we e utilised for he analysis. Th  sample i cluded all teach rs working in 
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Using a difference-in-d fference-in-difference app oach, Clotf lt r e al. [100,101] c mpared 
hazard r s before and af er th  implemen ation of the b nus pr gramme; eligible and in ligible 
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points. However, t is reflects a pattern already in p c  even before the programme was introdu ed. 
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In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performanc  bonus 
scheme that provided perfor ance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-tre t (ITT) and tr atment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
sh ing positive eff cts. These w re no rated higher because of
s m li itations i t res rch design. hese studi s suggest that financial incenti es, such as higher
wages, stipends and bonu es c n en ce t c s t teach in challengi g school . DeFeo et al. [85]
imated that higher salaries ar ne ded t attr ore qu lified teach rs to t ach in hard-to-staff
scho ls. They a alysed data from welve Alaskan cho l comm iti s in three districts to determine
the mini um s lary e ded to attract highly qualified achers in rural com uniti s in Alaska,
and how much mor s ne ded t get t achers to teach in diffi ult-to-staff schools. T ir a alysis
suggests that to co p n ate for factors that migh ak ommunity or school more or less attra tive,
alary differe tial woul hav to b betw en 0.85 nd 2.01 with hard- o-staff schools having higher
differentials. The diff entials i clud costs of liv am ng other working and living conditions that
aff ct teachers staying or leaving communitie . S , it m ht be t e case that t attract maths and science
graduates (who wo ld command hig r sal ries lsewh ), the s lary differential would have to be
big noug to compe sate for the diff r ce they w uld othe wis get. I has to be mentioned that the
amount of the bonus w uld have t be th s l ry diff ences on the t acher’s actu l sal ry and not the
stat salary schedule as som distric were already paying teach rs or han was s ipulated in the
stat sala y ch dule. Otherwis ev n with com ens tory b us, t ach r ’ salaries ould be the s me
r even b low what they were already getting.
Fitzg rald [86] ev luat d the impact th High Pri rity L cation Stip n Program in Mia i,
Flori a. The stipends vari d between $500 a d $2000 annually epending on the positio of the staff
and the numb r of ye rs they wo ked in th high priority areas. Over thr e yea s, acancies in treatment
ls fell substan ially from the ba e ye while t a er and vaca i s in the control schools went up
( ffect size 1.3). This was a quasi-experimental study compari 25 scho ls in the programme with
25 compa able control schools. High riority sc ools wer th e with a high p portion of stud nts
receiving fr /reduced lunch s. Cont ol schools ere similar in pu il and teacher characteristics but
not designated as high priority schools. The treatm t sch ols w re selected for the stipend based
on their high vacancies and lower ret ntion of teachers suggesting that there w re some inherent
differ ces betw en them. Cont ol scho ls may be more attractiv to teachers by virtue of the fact
that they had l we vac ncies to start with. The design was unable to take account of changes in
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circumstances within the schools (such as pupil intake), which could have affected teacher satisfaction
and thus the retention rates.
Glazerman et al. [87] examined the impact of the Talent Transfer Initiative, which offered bonuses
to the highest performing teachers for agreeing to move to and stay in low-performing schools.
The incentive was $20,000 paid in instalments over a two-year period. Teachers who were already
teaching in low-performing schools received a $10,000 retention stipend if they remained in the school
over the two-year period. The participants included 85 teacher pairs matched on school characteristics
and randomised to intervention or not, across 114 elementary and middle schools. Because the teacher
pairs changed their personnel between randomisation and the start of the school year, the two groups
were no longer equivalent at the beginning of the study. Of the vacancies assigned to the scheme, 88%
were filled, compared to 44% the year before, and 71% in the comparison group.
Hough and Loeb [88] used a difference-in-difference approach, comparing the recruitment and
retention of 1611 applicants in the San Francisco Unified School District. The district awards higher
salaries/bonuses for teachers teaching shortage subjects, and in schools with a high proportion of poor
and ethnic minority students. Teachers were also given a retention bonus if they stayed on after four
years and more after eight years. The results showed an increase in the proportion of shortage subject
teachers in hard-to-staff areas from 27% to 37%. There was also an increase in the proportion of new
hires in the targeted group (those that received the incentives) from 49% to 54%.
Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a $20,000
incentive to attract and retain new teachers to low-performing schools for four years. Teachers had to
repay $5000 for each year that they did not meet the commitment. An instrumental variable design
was used, based on 718 GTF teachers, excluding those who could not be tracked, were missing data, or
not enrolled at recognised institutions. GTF recipients were not randomly selected, and so may have
had a predisposition to teach in low-performing schools. Twice as many teachers were enrolled during
GTF as in the years before and after, and 28% more taught in low performing schools. It seemed that
money was an attractor.
A UK study suggested (indirectly) that monetary incentives may be effective only in attracting
those already intending to teach, not those who would not have considered teaching anyway [90].
This was an experiment with 1574 undergraduates (but data for 1496 was analysed) to test whether
financial incentives would attract high ability students into teaching. Instead of asking students
directly whether they would be motivated by financial incentives, which runs the risk of students
giving answers which they think are desirable or acceptable, the authors presented participants with a
hypothetical task for which they were rewarded for effort. In addition, they were offered an initial
up-front payment or “endowment” conditional on their subject and predicted degree classification.
This was to mimic the incentives offered for initial teacher training (ITT) bursaries. In England,
the government offered differentiated bursaries for different degree subjects and degree class with
high priority subjects attracting higher bursaries. Bursaries were found to be strongly and positively
associated with intentions to become a teacher and to do initial teacher training, although the causality
appears to be in the opposite direction. Those intending to be teachers were more likely to give greater
importance to bursaries, instead of (or as well as) the other way around. The effect was stronger for
women who were more likely to want to be primary school teachers than secondary. Those in the third
year of study were also less likely to express intention to teach. This study was based on hypotheticals
and on participants’ expression of intention to become a teacher which weakens its validity.
Using a difference-in-difference approach, Falch [91] compared the recruitment rate of teachers
within Norwegian public schools with variable wage premium using data from the 1990s when wages
were centralized. Treatment schools had a certain level of teacher shortage and were thus eligible for
wage premium. Of 79,135 teachers, 10,868 worked in one of the three counties with treatment schools,
and 2034 worked at a treatment school. Because control schools did not have recruitment issues,
comparisons were made with schools with persistent teacher shortages outside the three counties,
which were not eligible for the wage premium. The results showed that the recruitment rate was
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higher in treatment schools than non-treatment schools (effect size 0.13). A 10% increase in wage
increased recruitment by about 30%. The wage premium appeared to be more effective in attracting
young female teachers into teaching than older male teachers. Although a large study, this was a
passive design.
In a longitudinal time-series analysis, Zarkin [92] developed an economic model to test how
responsive the “reserve pool” of teachers is to the teacher salary at the time. The reserve pool of teachers
in one year was estimated as the average proportion of certified teachers to the total certified over the
20-year period, multiplied by the total number meeting the minimum certification requirements in
that year. They estimated that a 20% increase in wages could induce a 14% increase in the supply of
secondary school teachers, and that secondary teachers were more responsive than primary teachers to
an increase in salaries.
One 2
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] valuated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Educat on a d Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity d sign xploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determi es eligibility for he retention bonus in articipating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation pla form, CODE (contai s value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample includ d all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 chool year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
study showed mixed outcome—successful for som schools only. Fulbeck and Richards [93]
expl red the eff cts of ProComp, a performanc -based fi ancial incentive, on teacher mobility in
Denver, CO, USA. Tea ers were awarde an additional $24,000 if they taught in top performing
schools, high growth schools o hard-to-staff schools. S ven such incentives were given to individual
teachers for meeting student performanc t rgets, and three were school-based incentives awarded
to teachers who taught at hard-to-staff schools serving low-income population, high performing
schools and schools that make the ost progress in maths and reading. However, ProComp was
eligible only to those who w re members of teacher union and who did not work in Charter schools.
The sample i cluded all public school teachers in Denver from 2006–2010 who were eligible for the
in entive (regardless of whet er they received it) and who made at least one voluntary move within
the district (n = 989). Using conditional logit models, he authors predicted which school a teacher
would transfer to given their individual characteristics, the characteristics of their current school,
and the characteristics of the school they could be transferring to. The results portrayed the incentive
a successful in attracting teachers to high growth and h gh performing schools, but less successful
in getting te ch rs into sc ols with a high proportion of low-income pupils or hard-to-staff schools.
Financial in entives also id not encourage teachers to move out of the area they were currently in.
Another 2
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controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
studi s f und n impact of finan ial incentives on teacher recruitment. Bueno
an Sass [94] asse sed the impact f the Georgia’ bonus system ( monetary compensation) on the
re ruitment and etent on of maths and science teac er . The b nus system increased the pay of
new maths and science teachers to ma it equ l to hat of a teacher with six years of experience.
A difference-i - ifferenc model was us d to e timate the impact of the differential pay programme on
the likelihood of becoming a teacher by comparing the difference between graduates with majors in
m ths and science and othe educati n ajors in th chang befor and after the programme period.
They found that differential pay did not incr ase the numbe of maths or science teachers nor did it
encourag people to switch to maths or science.
Gorard et al. [95] compared thr e groups of 4469 UK unde graduates, classified as never considered
teaching, considered teach g but rejected it, and i tending to teach. Before being asked about teaching,
tud nts w re sk d ab ut wha they were looking for in a car er. The never considered teaching group
was clearly the most different, and already n a trajectory t a “vocational” outcome like dentistry,
medicine, architecture, engineering and so on. Once b ckground factors, especially prior qualifications,
had been ac ounted for, there was no differ nce betwe n those intending to be teachers and the rest in
terms of the extent t which pr spectiv pay was a factor in their decision.
4.1.2. Alternative Routes into Teaching
Only one study that looked at the impact of an alternative teacher preparation programme for
teachers (Table 4) was rated 2
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Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three modera ly high evid nce studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
, and so is discussed here.
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Table 4. Number of studies with each security rating: Alternative routes and teacher supply.
Security Rating Positive Outcome Unclear/Mixed Outcome Neutral or NegativeOutcome
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experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
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in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
1 - -
Boyd et al. [96] compared the qualifications and retention of the Maths Immersion Program (MIP),
teachers to New York City mathematics teachers who began their careers through other pathways.
The study found the Maths Immersion programme was successful in attracting highly qualified teachers
to teach in some of the most challenging schools. The number of such teachers increased from 2003
to 2008 at a faster rate than those who were prepared through the traditional college (CR), Teaching
Fellowships (TF) and Teach for America (TFA) routes. They also had better academic qualifications
than traditionally prepared peers, but weaker qualifications than TFA teachers.
4.1.3. Teacher Accountability
There is only one study that examined teacher accountability on the supply and quality of teachers
(Table 5). High stakes teacher evaluation reforms were introduced across the different states in the US
at different times. Kraft et al. [97] took advantage of this differential timing to estimate the impact of
teacher accountability reforms on the supply and quality of new teachers using a combination of panel
datasets from 2002 to 2016 in a difference-in difference approach comparing teacher supply (the number
of licenses granted) and teacher quality (measured using the Barron’s ranking of the teachers’ training
college) across different states. They compared the outcomes seven or more years prior (pre-reform) to
a reform and three or more years after a reform (post-reform). High-stakes evaluation reforms reduced
the number of licenses granted in a state by 2.69 per 10,000 18-to-65-year-olds. The reforms also made
it difficult for hard-to-staff schools to fill vacant positions. On the other hand, teacher evaluation
reform did raise the quality of teachers, increasing the likelihood of a teacher graduating from a higher
ranking college by 8.1 percentage points.
Table 5. Number of studies with each security rating: Teacher accountability and teacher supply.
Security Rati g Positive Outcome Unclear/Mixed Outcome Neutral or Negative Outcome
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teachers who received a small award rather tha  no award. However, this st dy found that teachers 
who receive  a large award were less likely than teachers w o received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perha s teachers in receipt of a large award are hig  performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bon s incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Educatio  and Training) teac ers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity esign exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Te nessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to re ay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the enalty clause. 
Using a ifference-in-difference-in-difference a proach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
- - -
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus progra  for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplement d by county-lev l economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
- 1
In summary, the most promising approach appears t be financial incentives. While substantial
increa s in salary may b linked to better recruitm nt in en ra , and perhaps in hard-to-staff areas
and scho ls as well, studies that take the background of teachers or potential teachers into account
suggest that salaries are not as important [95]. There is als the suggestion that monetary inducements,
like bonuses and bursaries, may attract teachers in high demand subjects, but the evidence indicates
that such incentives disproportionately attract those already interested in teaching, and are more
successful in getting trainees into desirable schools rather than hard-to-staff ones.
The evidence for the different routes into teaching is not strong as there is only one medium-quality
piece on this. There are no robust studies at all on most of the other approaches.
4.2. Approaches to R taini g T achers
The evidence on teacher retention is more mixed than for recruitment (Table 6). There are no
4
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 48 
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who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps t achers in rec ipt of a large award re high performing teach rs w o can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] ev luated the US$5000 retention bonus pro am for 
effective tea hers in Tennessee’s Priority Scho ls (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the ret ntion of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention f Lev l 5 (Di loma in Educ tion nd Training) teachers. This was  quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontin ity design exploiting th  sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the r tenti n bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic d ta and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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show d that the bo us in entive incre sed the retentio  of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
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Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
haz rd rates b fore and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the sa e schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subj cts in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus f $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
rec ive the bonus as long as t ey stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incenti e did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not rge enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
de ign and impl mentation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teacher  i dicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating p ofessional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
tea ers across eligible schools and those in sc ools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% incr se reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. How ver, this reflects a pattern already in place ven before the programme was introduced. 
Includi g th  school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster ra domi ed control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
cheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bo us program h d o effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil ffect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based centives may not b  effective. Part cipating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
n $3000 p r full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on st dents and te chers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools th t were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
wer  not offered the opportunity to participate. 
rating, all had unclear, neutral or n gativ outcomes.
The majority of studi in this section either focus on financial incentive interventions or those which
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provide professional development and/or mentoring. Several of those relating to financial incentives
have already been described above under recruitment, and so are referred to only briefly below.
Table 6. Security rating of studies on retention.
Security Rating Positive Outcome Unclear/MixedOutcome Neutral or Negative Outcome
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
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rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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Nationally represent tive administrativ  data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s o line teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estima es for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. Th  sample included all teachers working in 
Prio ity Schools in Tennessee du ing the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) fo nd no eff ct of financial incentives  teacher 
r t ntion. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Gov rnor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) sch me, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing sch ols. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There w s no diff rence in rete tion 
rates (75% over four years) betw en recipient and non-recipients, despit  the penalty clause. 
Using a differe c -in-differe e-in-differ n e approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus r gra me; eli ible and i eligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
dis ontinuity d si n. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive ai ed at retaining qualifi d teac ers 
in targeted subj cts in high poverty or academically challe ging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for n annu l bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the b nus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results sugg st that th  bonus inc ntive di  not reduce turnover rates. Howev r, it is n t cl ar 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not larg  nough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
desig  and implementation of the progr m as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses fr  principals and tea ers indicated that t e $1800 bonus alone was not 
enou h to retai  teachers. Th y suggeste  th t administrative support, improving chool conditions 
and f ilitating professional develop ent might be bett r options. C mparison was made with 
teac rs across eligible schools and th se in schools that narrowly missed out based n the thr shol  
eligibility. The results showed that t achers receiving  bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
f the school year c mp red to other teachers in the same school. This incr ased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increas  reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even b fore the programme was intr duced. 
Including t e school fixed effects in the regression the effect was neg tive. 
In a cluster randomised control tri l, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance b nus 
scheme that provided perf rman e bonuses to school staff based on their scho ls’ progress report. 
Usi g both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed t t 
th  teacher performance bonus progr m had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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4.2.1. Financial Incentives
The evidence on financial incentives for retention is less clear than for recruitment. All of the
stronger studies (3
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study f und that teachers 
who receiv d a large award were less likely than teachers who ceived a small award to be retained 
in th  distri . Perhaps teachers in receipt of  ar e award are high perfor ing teachers who can 
easily find bet r paid jobs ls wher . 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retentio  bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design xploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic ata and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online tea er evaluation p atform, CODE (contai s value-added 
estimates for te chers) were utilised or the analysis. T e sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools i  Tennessee duri g the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidenc  studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a diff renc -in- ifference-in-diff re ce approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before n aft r the mpl ment ti  of th bonus progra me; eligibl  and ineligible 
eachers in the same scho ls using a hybrid of a random zed exp riment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the pro ram as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Surv y responses from principals and eachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested tha  administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
) d not suggest clear be efits (Table 7).
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scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
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The large study by Ros [84], discus ed more fully in the recruitment section above, for example,
fo nd no clear evidence tha districts offering incentives had higher teacher retention, at least after the
first year.
Shifrer, Turley and Heard [98], another 3
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The l rge stud  by Rose  [84], discussed more fully in t  r cruitme t section above, for 
example, found no cl ar evidenc  that di tr cts offering incentives had higher teacher re en ion, at 
least after the first y ar. 
Shifrer, Turley an  eard [98], another 3🔒, looked at whe her ctual receipt and the amount of 
perf rmance pay award in an u ban school district as opposed to ligibility made a difference to 
eachers’ decision o leave or stay. Using the difference between a large and a small award as the cut-
off threshold, they onduct d a regression disc tinuity analysis using census data for 12,000 
teacher  although they foc sed only on 3363 teac ers. Tea hers n the top quartile of value-added 
scores were r w rded wi  a large award and t ach r  with a value-added score in the second 
quartile a small award. Thei  analysis showed that likelihood of retention was slightly higher for 
, looked at hether actual receipt and the amount
of performance pay award in an urban school district as opposed to ligibility ade a difference to
teach rs’ decisio to leave or tay. Using he differ nce between a large and a small award as the
cut-off threshold, they c ucted a regression disco inuity an lysis using census data for 12,000
teachers although they focused only n 3363 teachers. Teachers in the top quartile of value-added
scor s wer rewarded with a large award and te chers ith a value-added score in the second quartile
a small award. T eir analysis showed that likelihood of retention was slightly higher for teachers who
receiv d a small award r ther than no award. However, this study found that teachers who received a
large award wer less lik ly than teachers who rec iv a small award to be retained in the district.
Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high p rforming teachers who can easily find better
id jobs els where.
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Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for effective
teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study showed
that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but not the
retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-experimental
study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s overall
evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. Nationally
representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data from the
TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added estimates for
teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in Priority Schools
in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year.
Three moderately high evidence studies (3
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scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
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for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
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2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
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reported positive outcomes of fi ancial inc ntives on teacher retention,
but the effects w re either short-lived or involved some kind of a tie-in. Bueno and Sass [95] found
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that salary compensation only had a short-term effect on the retention of teachers. They compared
teachers who were eligible with those who were not. The attrition rate for bonus recipients was lower
than non-recipients, but only in the first five years when they were receiving the bonus. Working and
living conditions, lack of community engagements were reported to be important factors in teachers’
decision to stay or leave.
Falch [103] used a natural experiment taking advantage of changes in the wage system in Norway
over a nine-year period (1993/94–2002/03) to look at whether giving teachers a higher salary would make
them more likely to stay in teaching. Over that time, teachers in schools with high teacher vacancies
were eligible to receive a wage premium of between 7.5% and 12%. In total, there were 161 treatment
schools. Of these 104 received wage premium for less than four years. The difference-in-difference
analysis comparing the turnover rates before and after wage premium was introduced showed that
wage premium reduced the probability of quitting a school by 4.8 percentage points. Taking into
account school district characteristics, the effect of the wage premium increased to 5.8 percentage points.
The wage effect was larger for males and for the married teachers than for females and unmarried.
Teachers’ age and whether they have children or not also affect the size of the effect. There was no
impact on the retention of younger teachers, and female teachers were less responsive to wage increases
than older and male teachers.
Another incentive scheme is the Florida Critical Shortage programme is a state-wide programme
to increase the supply of teachers in shortage subjects. Feng and Sass [104,105] evaluated the effects
of two components of the scheme. The loan forgiveness component of the programme was targeted
at beginning teachers teaching in shortage areas where teachers qualified in that subject were given
up to $10,000 to pay off their student loan if they continued to teach in shortage subjects for at
least 90 days. The other component was a one-off retention bonus for teachers teaching certain
subjects and grade levels. Retention bonus was capped at $1200 per teacher. To be eligible teachers
would have taught in a shortage area, agreed to continue teaching that subject the following year
and have had a favourable performance appraisal. Using difference-in-difference and instrumental
variable approaches, the authors compared the probability of attrition and recruitment of eligible
and non-eligible teachers for each shortage subject. The effect of loan forgiveness was estimated
by comparing changes in retention of eligible teachers when a subject was designated as a shortage
subject with those of non-eligible teachers over time. The results showed that loan forgiveness reduced
the probability of overall attrition by 12% (10% for maths and 9% for science teachers). The effect
disappeared when the funding was reduced. The one-off retention bonus resulted in a reduction of
likelihood of shortage subject teachers leaving Florida by 25%., but no effect on retention in the school
they were currently teaching.
Fitzgerald [86] also found that the impact of financial incentives is short-lived. The effect of the
High Priority Location Stipend Program was observed only in the first year after implementation. No
differences were found in the following years. Staff who left indicated that while they were appreciative
of the incentives, they did not think the stipend was high enough. Their main concerns were the
working conditions, discipline in school, management support and admin/teacher relations. Control
teachers also indicated that they would be happy to work in the high priority areas if student discipline,
working conditions and admin/teacher relations were improved.
Pension enhancements have also been used in states in the US to encourage teachers to stay until
their retirement. Koedel and Xiang [106] examined one such scheme in St Louis, Mississippi using
the six-year administrative panel data covering the school years 1994–1995 through 1999–2000. They
compared the likelihood of eligible teachers (i.e., those retiring after June 1999) with those not eligible
using a difference-in-difference analysis. This resulted in a 60% increase in pension wealth for the
eligible teachers, and had the effect of delaying the retirement only of teachers who were a year close
to retirement, but not for other groups.
Glazerman et al.’s [87] analysis of the Talent Transfer Initiative, described in the section on
recruitment, was also linked to increased retention. But this is because a condition of the incentive
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is that teachers agree to move or stay in the low-performing school Retention in the first year was
93% (70% in the comparator group), but dropped to 60% after two years (compared to 51% in the
comparator group). This suggests that the effect of the incentive was not long lasting and loses its
effect once the payment stopped.
Murnane and Olsen [107] examined the career histories of 13,890 North Carolina teachers to
estimate the impact of salaries on teachers’ longevity in teaching. Regression models were developed
using a number of key explanatory variables to predict the length of stay in teaching. Results of the
analysis indicated that a $1000 increase in each step of the salary scale (measured in 1987 US Dollars) is
associated with an increase in median duration of two to three years for a teacher starting their career
in 1970. The findings suggest that a uniform salary scale may not work in retaining teachers in fields
such as chemistry and physics that are in demand in business and industry. This echoes the findings of
other studies which found that for financial compensation to be effective it has to be large enough to
cover the differential salary that teachers would get if they had not gone into teaching.
Springer et al. [108] evaluated the District Awards for Teaching Excellence (D.A.T.E), a state-funded
incentive pay award in Texas. All districts in the state were eligible to receive grants, but participation
was voluntary. The average award for teachers ranged from $1361 in districts with district-wide
plans to £3344 in districts with select school plans. The study showed that the likelihood of leaving
increased for teachers who did not receive the award, but the probability of leaving fell sharply for
those who did receive the award. The size of the award also matters. In districts with relatively small
maximum awards, turnover increased, but turnover fell as the awards increased until it exceeds $6000
beyond which it makes no difference. However, not all districts and not all schools were eligible for
participation, and it is not clear what the eligibility criteria were. Districts and schools that received
the award may be systematically different to those not eligible for the award. The factors that exclude
them for eligibility may be relevant to teacher turnover.
In a pilot study, Springer and Taylor [109] found mixed effects on a pay-for-performance program
(Governor’s Educator Excellence Grants/GEEG) in Texas. The Texas GEEG programme, was a
three-year programme involving 100 schools (analysis performed with 94 schools) identified as the
highest-poverty, high-performing schools in the state. Schools were awarded non-competitive grants
ranging from $60,000 to $220,000 each year for three years. The individual award for each full-time
teacher was between $3000 and $10,000. Using a combination of data from different sources the author
analysed teacher turnover for six academic years. The results showed that turnover was higher among
beginning teachers in schools with only individual incentives than in schools with only schoolwide
incentives, but only in the first year. No differences were detected in subsequent years. The opposite
was true for experienced teachers where turnover was lower in schools with school-level incentives
than in schools with a combination of individual and school level incentives in the first year, but the
pattern was reversed in the second year. No differences were detected between school and individual
level incentives in the third year, suggesting the short-term effects of such incentive award.
A further four 2
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studies show d uncle r or mix d outc mes. Booker and Glazerman [110]
l t the Missouri Career Ladd r (CL) Program to test the effect of pay increases on teachers
at diff rent tages of thei career. Based on their performance-level eligible teachers received
supplementary pay for taking on certain sponsibil ti s or professional development outside their
contracted hours. Teachers w re observed and evaluated as they moved up the career ladder in three
stages. The amount of bonus was also rela d to the length of teaching experience. For each stage
teachers received more suppl me tary pay up to £1500 for Stage 1, £3000 for Stage 2 and £5000 for
Stage 3. The uthors comp red the retention rates of teachers in districts offering the Career Ladder
incentive with similar teachers in non-Career Ladder districts. Th re was no difference in retention
rates between CL and non-CL districts after controlling for observable differences such as wealth, size
and population densit in regression models. Using instrumental variables controlling for district
election into CL participation, teachers in CL districts w re less likely to move to a different district.
The mod l pr dicted that after 10 years teachers in CL districts were less likely to move compared
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to similar teachers in non-CL districts (81% remain vs 77%). The oldest teachers (after 11 years and
receiving the biggest bonuses) were half as likely to move compared to their non-CL peers. It was more
effective in retaining younger teachers in the profession but not necessarily in the district. The authors
estimated that incentive payments need to exceed 25% of teacher salary to neutralise the effects of
turnover in hard-to-staff urban schools. One complication is that this programme also had an element
of enhancing teacher autonomy. Therefore, it is not clear how much of the effect was due to the
incentive and how much was the result of teachers’ enhanced autonomy.
In another study Fulbeck [111] used interrupted time-series and difference-in-difference regression
models to analyse the impact of Denver’s Professional Compensation for Teachers Program (ProComp),
a teacher incentive programme that awards salary increases and/or annual incentives to teachers
who meet a range of requirements, such as having advanced qualifications, complete professional
development, teach in a hard-to-staff school or shortage subject and work at a high-achieving
school. ProComp was championed by Barack Obama as a model for teacher compensation reform.
The ProComp hard-to-serve incentive initiative (HTS) is one of 10 financial incentives aimed at
retaining teachers in schools with a high proportion of poor students. The number of teachers under
the scheme was between 3900 and 4200 each year. Panel data, teacher interview data, and data on
school characteristics were taken from Denver Public School and ProComp school-level information.
The study compared the retention rates of teachers before and after ProComp. It reported that
participation in ProComp increased retention rates by 2.1 percentage points. Regression analysis
showed that ProComp accounted for 2.5% of the variation in changes in retention rates. ProComp is
reportedly more effective in challenging schools at or above average participation (ES = 0.30), but less
meaningful for non HTS schools (ES = 0.05). The findings, however, are really difficult to interpret
as the graphs seem to contradict the findings reported. Also the incentive came in at the time of the
economic recession, which may have affected individual’s propensity to move.
Using multinomial hierarchical regression modelling of data taken over a year, Fulbeck [112]
estimated the risk of teachers moving within district and moving out of the district by comparing the
hazard rates of teachers who received ProComp with those who did not, and also between teachers
who taught in high poverty schools with those who did not. The results of the analysis showed that
receipt of ProComp reduced the odds of teachers leaving the district, but not out of schools within
the district. This relates only to those who volunteered to participate in ProComp and received the
$5000+ incentive. There was no effect on those who volunteered but did not receive the incentive.
These are likely to be teachers who did not meet the eligibility criteria in terms of performance and
knowledge/skills. However, ProComp was not effective in high poverty schools. In other words,
ProComp did not compensate for poor working conditions, school leadership and climate.
Choi [113] reported positive effects of the Quality Compensation program (Q Comp) on teacher
retention but only in schools that have implemented the scheme for five years—6.3 percentage points
higher compared to schools with less than five years of implementation. There was no benefit for
charter schools (retention rates 10.5 percentage points lower than other schools). Q Comp is an
alternative teacher compensation program (ACPs) under which teachers’ pay was based on their
performance, measured in terms of student achievement, leadership, professional knowledge and
skills, and instructional behaviour. The study used a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach
analysing data for 12,708 teachers and 1734 schools over 8 years. Teacher retention was calculated by
comparing the list of teachers in two subsequent years.
Four other 2
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indicated that financial i ent ves did not improv retention of teachers. A study in
England lo k d at wh ther pay reforms in England where schools re given the freedom to set pay
based on performance rather t an seniority have impacted on teacher retention. Anders et al. [43]
compared three groups of schools—the positive adopt rs where pay progression on average was faster
tha pre-reform seni rity-based salary schedule; egative adopters where pay progression was slower
tha xpected u d r re-reform; and mean-zero adopters where pay progression was as expected
under pre-reform pay schedule based on senior ty. Usi g a difference-in-difference framework the
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authors estimated the effect of pay reforms on teacher retention, using adopters as treatment groups.
The effect of the reform increased teachers’ pay at positive adopter schools by 4% while pay of teachers
in negative adopter schools fell by 3%. However, there were no effects on retention.
Dee and Wyckoff [114] reported a performance incentive programme (IMPACT) aimed at retaining
effective teachers in the District of Columbia. IMPACT had been successful in removing low performing
teachers and retaining high-performing teachers. Teachers were evaluated on a multifaceted measure
of teacher performance. Based on these evaluations low-performing teachers may be dismissed and
high performing teachers receive large financial incentives. The financial incentives included one-time
bonuses of up to $25,000 and permanent increases to base pay of up to $27,000 per year. Employing
a regression discontinuity design, they compared the retention and performance outcomes of 4000
low-performing teachers whose ratings placed them near the threshold at risk of strong dismissal threat.
The study also compared outcomes among 2000 teachers who had IMPACT scores just above and just
below the threshold between Effective and Highly Effective. The high stakes incentive programme
was successful in removing teachers at the threshold of being labelled minimally effective, but did not
improve the retention of high-performing teachers.
Hendricks [115] compared the attrition of teachers in districts which award teachers via pay for
year of experiences, with districts that do not. The study found no relationship between teacher pay
and turnover. Districts differ in terms of labour and market outcomes so those districts that award pay
increases by years of experience may already be experiencing high attrition of more senior teachers.
Hough and Loeb [88], described under recruitment, found no difference in the retention rates of
targeted and non-targeted teachers for higher salaries/bonuses. Over 90% of teachers stayed on in the
district and over 85% stayed in their school, in both groups. The comparison is made difficult because
of the economic downturn in 2008 when unemployment was high.
4.2.2. Teacher Development and Support
Previous studies have suggested that teacher development, which includes mentoring for
inexperienced teachers and induction for early career teachers can help support and retain teachers in
the profession. Our review found mixed results with the strongest studies showing no obvious benefit
of teacher induction, while the weaker studies are largely positive about mentoring and induction
(Table 8).
Table 8. Number of studies with security rating: Teacher support and retention.
Security Rating Positive Outcome Unclear/Mixed Outcome Neutral or NegativeOutcome
3
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, using randomized control desig s, showed that mentoring and induction did not make a
diff rence to teacher retention.
For example, Glazerman et al.’s [56] evaluation of a co prehensive teacher induction p ogramme
in Princ t n, New Jersey (US) fou d no imp ct on r t ntion of teachers who received either one or
two years f compreh nsive induction within school, distri t or teaching profession over the first four
ye s of the teach rs’ careers. This w s on of he strong st st dies using a randomis d control design
involv ng 1009 te ch r in 418 schools. T e me toring progra me consists of a year-long curriculum
for eginning te chers that focus s on effect ve teaching. Ment es also had he opportunity to obs ve
experienced teachers. In the s cond ye r, onthly Teaching and Learning Communities were held
where mentors and mentees met f r peer upport and to discuss aspects of classroom instruction. In
th s cond year, begi nin teachers also rec ived betwe n 35 and 42 h of profe sional development.
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Another randomised control evaluation of an induction programme for beginning teachers in
the Netherlands also showed no clear effect on teacher retention [116]. It involved 71 schools with
338 beginning secondary education teachers who were randomly allocated to receive the induction
arrangements or a business-as-usual control group. Because schools routinely provide beginning
teachers extra support, control teachers also received some induction albeit only for a maximum of
one year. Experimental teachers, on the other hand, followed the programme for three years under
controlled conditions arranged by the schools, which included workload reduction and professional
development. Both groups were similar in background characteristics. The results showed that three
years later, 14% of the control group and 12% of the experimental group had left. (ES = +0.076).
Importantly, the study found that it was the lack of certification and the low teaching skills that most
explained teachers leaving the profession.
The 2
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studies m stly reported positive outcomes. Allen and Sims [57] evaluated STEM Learning
Network professional deve pment courses intended to improve teachers’ subject, pedagogical and
career knowledge, confidence and motiv tion. The used retention data of teachers from England’s
Department f r Education (DfE) Scho l Wo kforce Census. This was matched with the National
STEM Learning N twork to identify teachers who participated in the CPD courses. The authors used
propensity score mat ing, matching participants with non-participants by known characteristics.
To co rol for unobserved diffe ences, compariso s w re made between those who participated in
2010 with those who participat d later. The autho s argued that these individuals were therefore
mo e likely to be similar in terms of mot vation and career plans. Further analyses were also made
comparing science departments in schools befor and after the treatment. The study suggests that
taking part in Natio al STEM Learning Network professional development is associated with an
increas in r tention in the profession as a whole. The odds that a participant stays in the profession
on year afte completing these courses as around 160% higher than for similar non-participants,
and the positive association s sustained two years l ter for recently qualified teachers. Using the
more rigorous double-difference and triple-difference mo els that takes into account factors that are
not i cluded in the demographic and background measures, the positive association is maintained.
However, there i no e idence that completing CPD courses improves retention within the schools that
teachers were working in at the time of participation.
Co en [117] used administrative dat for 51,811 US pub ic school beginning teachers comparing
whether they had received a formal induction programm or not, and their perceptions of workload
and class oom support. They c rrelated these variables with whether teachers stayed on the following
yea . Analysis on teacher inducti n was ba ed on 3172 new public school teachers. This indicated
that teachers who l ft r ported less mentoring than stayers (effect size 0.12) and less supportive
commun cation (effect size −0.04) and less common planning (effect size 0.11). Higher workload
reduction levels did not relate to turnover.
De Angelis, W ll and Che [118] found that having more comprehensive mentoring and induction
support significan ly decreased the odds of new eachers changing districts and leaving the profession
after one y ar. Quality of teach r support was based on teachers’ self-report of their perceptions. It is
ther fore possible that teachers who were more likely to le ve or had no intention to stay in teaching
were more likely to report less favourable perceptions of programme quality.
De Jong and C mpoli [119] analysed t observational data from the 2007–2008 Schools and Staffing
Survey (SASS) to see if the use of curricular coaches is associated with teacher retention. Curricular
coaching provides n w teachers with the techniques to incorporate evidence-based instructional
methods in their local context. Using multinomial lo istic regression analysis, they compared the
likelih od of teach rs leaving profession, staying or moving school of those who had a curricular coach
and those who did not. They found that early career teachers in a school with a curricular coach was
less likely to leave the profession (relative risk ratio = −0.52). The effect was stronger for first year
tea hers, but much less so for second and third year teachers. However, having a curricular coach did
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not have an influence on early career teachers’ decision to move school. It is possible that this was the
period of economic recession when there is less incentive to change profession.
Glazerman and Seifullah [23] evaluated the Chicago Teacher Advancement Program (TAP),
a teacher development and compensation programme. The implementation of the programme was
staggered across all schools with schools randomly assigned to implement sooner or later, creating
comparison group for analysis. Teacher retention was measured by comparing the retention of a
matched sample of over 2600 teachers in Chicago TAP and conventional public schools. In this
programme teachers and mentors met weekly in their “cluster groups”. Teachers were also given
performance incentives and had the opportunity to assume leadership roles. The results showed
positive effects on school retention only for the first cohort but the effect was not consistent across
cohorts. More teachers from the first cohort returned to their same school three years later compared
to teachers in non-TAP schools, an impact of nearly 12 percentage points. In other words, teachers
in Chicago TAP schools were about 20% more likely than teachers in comparison schools to be in
those same schools three years later. For teachers in schools that started the Chicago TAP in later
years, the impact was not obvious. There was some evidence of impacts on retention for subgroups of
teachers, such as those with less experience, but there was no consistent pattern.
A correlational study using a nationally representative sample showed a positive correlation
between participation in induction/mentoring programmes and the likelihood of teachers leaving
or moving school. However, it is not just having mentors, but having same-subject mentors that
mattered [120]. Having mentors from different subject areas had no influence on beginning teachers’
decision to leave. The study analysed data from the School Staffing Survey (SASS) and the Teacher
Follow-up Survey (TFS) which included a sample of 3235 beginning teachers in their first year of
teaching. The survey asked teachers about their participation in any form of induction programme
including mentoring, CPD, collaboration with other teachers and support. The multiple kinds of
support included in these induction programmes meant that it was not possible to isolate which of
these were most effective. Although the authors controlled for school and teacher effects, they were
unable to control for unobserved differences between teachers and schools. Because those who received
mentoring and those who did not were not randomly allocated, there may be inherent differences
between these two groups. It could be that schools or districts that offer mentoring support are
generally more supportive of their teachers, or have better working environment.
Latham and Vogt [121] compared the retention propensity of 506 elementary education graduates
in Illinois who had opted to undertake teacher preparation in a professional development school (PDS)
with another group of 559 traditionally prepared graduates matched on demographic characteristics.
The authors claimed that those trained in PDSs (defined as having elements of field placement, onsite
coursework and professional development) were more likely to stay in teaching for longer (about 0.25
of SD more than those who did not). It is important to note that the PDS group were self-selected and
hence were likely to be different to those that were in the non-PDS group.
Papay et al. [122] found that graduates of the Boston Teacher Residency Programme were less
likely to leave teaching in the first year (12%) than other new Boston public school teachers (27%). By
the fifth year, retention rates among BTR teachers were still higher than other public school teachers in
Boston (49% vs 25%). However, it has to be mentioned that BTR teachers were committed to teach in
Boston for three years after their residency year or pay a penalty equivalent to the programme tuition
fees of up to $10,000. They were more likely to stay until their fifth year, and did not leave suddenly
after their third year when their commitment had been fulfilled.
Ronfeldt and McQueen [123] drew on the SASS, TFS and BTLS data to investigate whether
different kinds of induction supports predict teacher turnover among first-year teachers. To mitigate
against unobserved factors, the authors used propensity score matching of demographic characteristics
to link 1600 teachers receiving extensive induction (i.e., 4 to 6 induction supports) with 1130 teachers
not receiving extensive induction (i.e., 0 to 3 types of support). Unlike previous studies that focused
on only one cohort, this study looked at three recent cohorts of teachers. In total, there were 13,000
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across the three waves, but only 2340 were first year teachers that could be linked to both teacher and
school characteristics. The authors correlated the level of induction support with teacher outcomes
(leaving school and leaving profession). Multilevel regression analyses showed a negative correlation
between the number of combined induction supports and teachers’ likelihood of leaving school or
teaching in their second year and across five years. Receiving extensive induction supports reduced
migration by 5% compared with not receiving extensive induction supports. Of all the induction
supports, supportive communication with school leadership had the biggest impact, reducing the
odds by 55% to 67%. Every additional induction support was associated with an average decrease in
the odds of leaving teaching by between 18% and 22%. One major limitation of this study is that the
measure of induction is based on teacher self-report and this is prone to reporting biases.
Speidel [124] evaluated a teacher development programme, known as the Skills, Tips, and Routines
for Teacher Success (STARTS), in the Volusia County Schools (Florida) designed for teachers of students
with special needs. The study utilized data on the employment histories of 771 new special needs
teachers for school years 1998/99 to 2003/2004. The findings suggest that the programme makes a
positive difference in the retention rate of teachers who took part in STARTS. However, there were no
controls for differences between the two groups of teachers. There were other variables that might
have been in play with respect to teacher retention that were not accounted for.
Further, one 2
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group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
showed mixed outcome. Weisbend r [125] evaluated the California Mentor
Teacher Program which was developed to retain experienced teachers and to assist new teachers in the
transition in teaching. Under this scheme, ighly talent d classroom teachers (mentors) were given
the incentive to continue teaching and to use their instru tio al expertise to mentor their peers and
ne teachers (mentees). Th study included 336 mentors and 638 of their mentees in 240 schools and
46 retire s in the Priority Staffing Program serving 46 schools. Personnel records and questionnaires
over a 5-y ar period were collected to assess the length of tim each cohort stayed in the district.
Comparisons were made between mentors and a matche group of non-mentors. Results varied from
cohort to coh rt. There was no effect on retentio for the first cohort, with non-mentees being more
lik ly t stay within the school distri t c mpared to mente s. With the subsequent cohorts, mentees
were more likely o stay compared to non-mentees. On the other hand, mentors were also more likely
to leave over t 5-y ar period than non-mentors. Although comparison mentors were matched,
the sel ction of highly ffective teachers suggest that the wo groups may not be equal. As Shifrer
et al. [98] noted, it may b the case the high performing te chers can find jobs more easily and are
ther fo e more mobile.
4.2.3. Alternative Routes to Teaching
There is no clear evidence that offering alternative routes into teaching is beneficial in retaining
teachers. Two studies rated 2
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of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
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comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
that examined alternative rout s nto teaching showed no clear
advantages of any alternati pathways in retaining teachers (Table 9).
T ble 9. Number of studies with security rating: Alternative routes and retention.
Secu ity Rat ng Positive Outcome Unclear/Mixed Outcome Neutral or NegativeOutcome
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Silv et al. [126] evalua ed a teac er residency progra me (known as the Teaching Quality
P rtnership Gran s Program), which w rks in p rtners ip with local school districts and universities
where prospective t ach rs complete a coursework with supervis d fieldwork exp rience teaching in a
s hool for at least a year. The dat shows that there is no difference in the retention rates of TRP and
non-TRP teachers within district (89% nd 87% respectiv y) and within schools (77% for TRP and 79%
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for non-TRP). Teachers who moved schools were more likely to move to higher performing schools
with a smaller proportion of ethnic minority children.
The second study by Boyd et al. [96] compared the Maths Immersion Programme with traditional
certification and Teach for America (TFA). Compared to their traditionally prepared peers, immersion
teachers were more likely to leave teaching in NYC (ES = −0.14) although less so than TFA teachers
(ES = −0.3). They were also more likely than traditionally prepared teachers to transfer or leave their
school (ES = −0.2). TFA teachers were more likely to leave teaching after four years but less likely to
leave their schools. This is a large study using administrative data.
4.2.4. Teacher Accountability
One commonly cited reasons for teachers leaving the profession is high stakes tests and
accountability pressures [127–129]. However, our review found that removing or reducing teacher
accountability does not seem to have a clear benefit on retention, although the evidence base is
particularly weak here (Table 10).
Table 10. Number of studies with security rating: Accountability and retention.
Security Rating Positive Outcome Unclear/Mixed Outcome Neutral or NegativeOutcome
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High stakes tests which increase teacher accountability are a reported source of stress. Fuchsman,
Sass and Zamarro [129] took advantage of a policy change in Georgia, US in 2011 when testing was
removed for Grades one and two and from 2017 onwards when testing for science and social science
were removed for Grades 6 and 7. The study compared the attrition rates of teachers in grades one to
eight, before and after testing and with teachers in other grades where testing had not been removed
using a difference-in-difference approach. The study found no impact on teachers’ likelihood of
leaving teaching, changing schools within a district, or moving between districts. However, there is
a reduction in the probability of teachers with 0–4 years of experience leaving the profession when
testing requirements were relaxed from 14 to 13 percentage points for teachers in grades 1 and 2 and
from 14 to 11 percentage points in grades 6 and 7. Although comparisons were made before and after
testing, the comparisons were not between similar groups.
Shirrell [130] estimated the impact of accountability under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)
where schools were held accountable for the performance of minority ethnic subgroups only if the
number of students in those subgroups exceeded a minimum subgroup size. Using the minimum
subgroup size threshold of 40 for a regression discontinuity analysis, Shirrell compared schools on
either side of the threshold before and after NCLB. A difference-in-difference analysis was also used
to compare teachers of different ethnic sub-groups. The study found that Black teachers in schools
that were held accountable for the performance of Black student subgroup were less likely to leave
than Black teachers in schools not accountable for the Black subgroup’s performance. There was no
difference in attrition for the White subgroup. One reason suggested could be that Black teachers
were more likely to be paired with minority ethnic pupils and it is possible that these teachers were
motivated to stay on in the school seeing that the schools were taking action to address the achievement
gap between Black and White students. Shirrell also surveyed student teachers before they began
teaching and after. The results showed that challenging working conditions generally do not predict
changes in student teachers’ career plans, although poor working conditions in training schools are
associated with decreases in the lengths of time they plan to teach during their careers. Overall, there
was no evidence that working conditions and accountability had any effect on attrition of ethnic
minority primary school teachers.
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Jones [131] used an instrumental variable approach to estimate teacher turnover under performance
pay incentives for maths and English teachers (an accountability system), employing nationally
representative datasets. Teachers in performance pay districts earned a salary that was $2825 less
than their counterparts in non-performance pay districts and the performance pay may be used to
compensate for the difference. Data from Teacher Follow-up Survey showed that performance pay
was not considered the most important reason for teachers’ decision to leave. Since the performance
pay incentives were rewarded at the school level, this finding may also suggest that other teachers
were free-riding on the efforts of Math and English teachers. Because the sample consisted of only 64
teachers caution is urged in interpreting this result. Also, implementation of performance pay incentive
vary between districts. For example, performance pay was more effective in reducing turnover when it
was implemented on a school level than on an individual level, and male teachers also responded more
positively than female teachers to performance pay. In summary, the evidence on retention is not clear.
5. Discussion
5.1. The Evidence on Recruitment and Retention to the Teaching Profession
In summary, financial incentives seem promising for attracting new teachers into teaching,
and in increasing the number of teachers in challenging schools with a high proportion of poor or
disadvantaged children. However, the effect is stronger for high performing schools and schools with
lower proportions of disadvantaged children. The evidence suggests that for financial incentives to
work, they have to be large enough to compensate for the challenges of working in less desirable
schools and areas, or to compensate for the salary that teachers would receive if they had been in
comparable profession. This is especially so for shortage subject teachers like maths and science where
graduates from these subjects tend to command a higher salary in the labour market. In England,
bursaries are offered to trainees in secondary shortage subjects. The lower proportion of bursary
holders in state-funded schools compared to non-bursary holders, suggests that the bursaries are not
attracting shortage subject teachers to state-funded schools. This may be because the bursaries are
not large enough. It is also possible that individuals who were awarded bursaries do not eventually
enter teaching because, unlike in many states in the US, there are no bonds or tie-ins to commit bursary
recipients to teaching. The effect of financial incentives is also not consistent across genders and
age groups. Wage premiums, for example, are potentially more effective in attracting young female
teachers than older male teachers, but more effective in retaining older male teachers.
As for retention, financial incentives do not seem as be as effective. Although many studies do
show positive results, the more robust studies which control for context suggest that teachers only stay
while the incentive is available. Such short-term results are not useful in solving the chronic shortage
of teachers. In fact, the evidence suggests that the use of discriminatory incentives may even worsen
overall retention. Eligibility for an incentive, or a small incentive, seems to make little difference.
Where incentives are used, they need to be substantial.
In many cases, monetary incentives work only because teachers are required to commit to teach
for a specified period or certain subjects in specified schools or areas as part of the contract agreement.
These incentives often entail a penalty for breaking the contract, raising questions about the value of
such an approach and the potential for a kind of enforced retention where teachers feel ‘tied-in’ to a
role that they no longer wish to do.
In recent months, in England, the government have announced pay increases for teachers across
the board [132,133]. These are not specific incentives nor attached to particular individuals, subjects or
regions as we have examined in the section above. However, the plans do indicate that teachers new to
the profession will receive a higher increase than those who are more experienced. The link between
teacher pay and recruitment/retention is still fairly unclear but it will be important to examine whether
these reforms do appear to have any impact on the number or type of graduates entering teaching, or
the number of teachers choosing to continuing working in schools.
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5.2. Beyond Financial Incentives—Implications for Policy, Practice and Research
Financial incentives have been used for decades to try and encourage increased numbers of
graduates to enter the teaching profession. Despite the evidence that they can have some positive
impacts, there is nothing to suggest that they are likely to ‘solve’ the recruitment challenges that
countries such as England and the US currently face on a longer term basis. Economists have argued
that the use of monetary incentives needs to consider how they interact with intrinsic and social
motivations and what happens when they are withdrawn [134].
Thus, it is important that policymakers and school leaders look to alternative or additional
approaches too. Relying primarily upon financial inducements is unlikely to be an effective and
sustainable strategy for recruitment and retention, and arguably it is not desirable either. It is not
clear, for example, whether the extrinsic motivation offered by financial incentives, leads to the best or
most-suited graduates entering teaching.
While monetary incentives may be potentially useful as a way to increase the supply of shortage
subject teachers and to attract teachers to challenging schools or areas, we question, for example,
whether they are necessarily the best approach to improving recruitment as it is quite clear that the
attraction is not lasting. Where prospective or qualified teachers are asked to report the factors that
influence their likelihood for entering or staying in teaching, or that might encourage those in the
profession to leave, money rarely features highly [27,32,33,94]. Instead there are other factors which
may offer more promise for recruitment and retention if addressed.
Support in schools for teachers in the early stages of their careers and continuing professional
development for established teachers appear to offer potential benefits for retention but are also
arguably important in their own right. The evidence for mentoring and professional development is
uniformly positive for mentees but the studies that we have to make these judgements are unfortunately
not of the strongest quality. The stronger studies do not show consistent positive effects [23,119]. There
is also little evidence on the effectiveness of specific induction programmes for retaining new teachers.
The few studies that have looked at this area are either methodologically fairly weak and/or report
mixed or unclear findings. The stronger studies find little or no impact. A consistent issue though is
the multi-faceted nature of these interventions which makes it difficult to identify, accurately measure
and understand the elements of the induction programmes. It is not always clear whether it is the
induction alone or a combination of other factors that makes a difference. Some of these studies also
use ‘intention’ to stay in the profession as an outcome rather than actual attrition figures. These are
issues which need to be factored into future design and evaluation of induction programmes.
In England, the government has recently introduced the Early Career Framework (ECF) with a
view to providing teachers with a strong induction programme, including early professional support,
mentoring and a reduced teaching timetable [28]. The potentially promising findings on some of
these areas in this review are therefore welcome news, but given the relative weakness of the studies,
it is not clear to what extent the ECF is an evidence-informed initiative, or how confident we can
be in its outcomes. Robust evaluations of the ECF in its early years, however, would provide some
much-needed evidence in this area and will be vital for informing ongoing iterations of the policy or
those like it.
Our review also tentatively points to the importance of improving school cultures and ethos for
recruitment and retention. While we found very few rigorous studies that evaluated interventions
related to areas such as accountability, teacher stress, working conditions, behaviour, workload or
levels of support from teachers/leaders, some of the correlational and survey-based studies indicate
that these could be valuable areas to explore further. As we note above, there are likely myriad other
reasons for improving some of these wider factors too, including pupil/teacher performance and
wellbeing. These could well be enough to justify the trialling of interventions that seek to achieve
such aims, with a view to also understanding their impact on recruitment and retention. While we
acknowledge that measuring and evaluating some of these school-level approaches at scale is arguably
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more complex than the evaluation of government-administered financial incentives, we would contend
that such evaluations are vital and should form an integral part of any new policy initiative.
Many of the interventions also seemingly address the symptoms rather than the cause of teacher
shortages. As See and Gorard [14] have shown, government policies that aim to improve the quality
of teachers has led to a reduction in the number accepted into teacher training. Manipulating the
number of teachers that can be trained in higher education institutions and reducing school funding
all have ramifications on the number of teachers in schools. A more coherent and long-term approach
to policies is therefore needed.
5.3. Strengths and Limitations of the Review
This review systematically and rigorously synthesised approaches and interventions used for
improving the recruitment and retention of teachers. It is the only comprehensive single-study review
that we know of which includes robust appraisal of the research design and methods used within each
study. This quality-appraisal is key to the claims that we are able to make in terms of the most effective
approaches and the strength or amount of evidence available to support them. While our review
focuses on the inclusion of studies using experimental or quasi-experimental designs, we have also
sought to acknowledge where evidence from other types of study might be helpful for understanding
particular issues or highlighting where there are potential evidence gaps. Finally, although our review
had broad parameters, included over 7000 studies at the outset and a process of careful and rigorous
screening, the criteria that we applied do mean that it is of course possible that relevant and potentially
useful studies have been missed or excluded.
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Appendix A
Template used for extracting data from each included study
Overview
Brief Description of the Intervention
- Aim and type of intervention: e.g., financial incentives (performance-related pay, scholarships,
bursaries, housing benefits, pension scheme)
- Phase: Primary/secondary/general
- Country:
- How the intervention works: There must be enough information to enable identification of key
features of a successful intervention, if it works.
Method
Research Design
- Does it have a control and comparison group?
- Does it have pre- and post- event comparison?
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- How is randomisation or other allocation to groups carried out?
- Was there an intervention?
Sample
- Size of sample
- How were samples identified?
- School characteristics, e.g., primary, secondary, rural, urban, challenging schools
- How many cases were lost at each stage?
Outcome Measures
What are the outcomes and how were they collected?
- Is there a pre-defined primary outcome, or is there an element of ‘dredging’ for success?
Analysis (if Relevant)
- What kind of analysis was carried out?
- Are there pre- and post-test comparisons?
- Are effect sizes cited or calculable?
- How was the performance of treatment and comparison groups compared?
Findings
- Reviewers’ analysis of the results (re-calculate effect sizes if not estimated or if in doubt).
Commentary
Aspects of the study that might threaten or enhance its validity. This could include fidelity to
treatment, quality of counterfactual, extraneous/confounding variables, other programmes going on
that may have affected the results, and conflicts of interest.
Appendix B
A ‘sieve for judging the trustworthiness of causal research studies (Gorard, 2017)
Design Scale Dropout Outcomes Other Threats Rating
Fair design for
comparison
(e.g., RCT)
Large number of
cases per comparison
group
Minimal attrition, no
evidence of impact
on findings
Standardised
pre-specified
independent
outcome
No evidence of
diffusion or other
threat
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Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
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Difference-in-Difference)
Medium number of
cases per comparison
group
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imbalance or attrition
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variation in delivery
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Appendix C
The table summarises pieces that were reviewed and rated below 2. These tended to be small-scale,
have considerable attrition, no clear comparator, and/or rely on reports of intention to stay or leave.
Study Strategy Impact Evidence
Adnot et al. 2017
Performance incentive
(financial incentives)
Positive effect in keeping
high-performing teachers in
high-poverty schools but not in
low-poverty schools
The analysis did not compare teacher
retention rates before and after IMPACT
nor did it evaluate whether IMPACT
improve retention of teachers in general.
The study was unable to identify
high-performing teachers who leave
DCPS because of IMPACT, the estimates
indicated that replacing
high-performing teachers who exit with
teachers who perform similarly is
difficult. Also leavers include both
voluntary and involuntary leavers.
Afolabi 2013
Professional
development
(Cross Career Learning
Communities)
Positive effect
Fewer treatment teachers left
teaching or moved from their
school than control teachers
QED
Groups were matched on individual
and school characteristics
Teachers participating in CCLC were
already in schools with a culture of
professional development (groups are
not equivalent)
The study period also coincided with
economic recession which may explain
the high retention and lower mobility
Barnett and Hudgens
2014
TAP (Teacher and
Student Advancement
Programme)
Small positive effect (ES = 0.05)
TAP schools are self-selected.
These schools are likely to be different
to the national average. Schools that
stopped TAP were not included in the
analysis. These maybe schools where
the programme had not worked. In
other words, only successful schools
were considered in the analysis.
Beattie 2013 Mentoring
No difference between groups
but teachers receiving support
from full-release mentors
reported more positive
experience
Small sample (87)
Some teachers were selected to receive
full-release mentors and some to
school-based mentors
Evidence based on teachers’ report of
intention rather than actual attrition
Bemis 1999 Mentoring
There is no clear impact of
mentoring on retention despite
the author’s claim that
mentoring programs were found
to be most influential on new
teacher retention for elementary
level teachers.
Small sample
Retention based on teachers’ self-report
High attrition, therefore, those who did
not respond may be different to those
who did. The results are therefore not
reliable.
Districts with mentoring may be
different to disctricts with no mentoring.
Different attrition rate may be a
reflection of differences in the districts.
Bobronnikov et al., 2013 Incentive grant
+ Increase in number going into
teaching, 80% teaching in high
need areas (but no comparator).
Not enough data to calculate ES
Unclear retention
Majority indicated they’d stay
on. But of the 6 states, 2 states
showed negative impact (no
comparison groups)
The study design was unable to test
whether recipients of the Noyce
programme would have gained teacher
certification in STEM subjects and go on
to teach in high needs areas in the
absence of the programme
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 262 30 of 45
Study Strategy Impact Evidence
Bond (2001) Salary
+ States where salary was
markedly lower than
similarly-education
professionals, there was higher
teacher turnover and reverse is
true (after controlling for family
background)
It is a correlational analysis and the
states being compared are not the same,
there are confounding factors that are
not accounted for.
Bowman 2007 Mentoring
Negative impact on retention
Experimental teachers were
more aware of the career
commitment which negatively
affect their withdrawal
intention.
Small sample (n = 30)
Comparison groups were not
equivalent.
Control teachers had more teaching
experience than experimental teachers.
No actual data on retention was
collected
Brown &Wynn 2009 Role of principal
Positive effect of principal
awareness of issues affecting
teachers on retention
Not an impact evaluation
Cheng and Brown 1992 Peer support/mentoring
Mixed results
• Positive effect in the first
year (ES = +0.12) but no
effect in the second year
(ES = +0.03
Evidence was based on teachers’
self-report.
The sample was small and imbalance.
The 2 groups were not equivalent.
Comparison teachers were those that
were not eligible for the programme. In
the second year, comparison teachers
were randomly selected to be in the
experimental group. Experimental
teachers were also designed to include
those that did not have prior experience.
Chou 2015
Mentoring (full-time
release for mentors with
financial rewards)
Negative result of full-time
release mentoring
The 2 school districts being compared
are different and the sample size of only
23 is too small to make any sensible
judgements on effectiveness.
Clamp 2011 Mentoring No effect
Comparison groups were self-selected,
coupled with the high attrition rates
and the self-report survey, the evidence
is weak.
Clewell and Villegas
2001
Alternative certification
Impact on recruitment unclear
(more pathways graduates
completed (75% vs 60%) and
ended up teaching in HTSS (84%
no comparison) than
traditionally certified teachers
+ on retention
ES = 0.1
Comparisons were made with national
average and traditionally certified
teachers. The 2 groups of people are
therefore likely to be different.
Paraprofessionals and
emergency-certified teachers,
for example, were already working in
the schools. It is therefore, hardly
surprising that they were more likely to
stay in the school or district where they
were trained. There was also no
comparison of before and after data.
Colson and Satterfield
2018
Financial incentive
(The Innovation
Acceleration Fund grant,
a compensation scheme)
+ impact on retention
80% of teachers on the scheme
were retained compared to 70%
not on the scheme (ES = 0.07)
The very small non-random sample,
and exclusion of teachers who did not
have TVAAS results meant that the
sample might be biased. Comparisons
were made with volunteers and
non-volunteers
Counts 2012 Induction
Positive effect
Administrative support and
workload were the strongest
predictor of teachers’
commitment to stay in the
school (R2 = 0.19 for both).
Calculation of means was used for
categorical variables (e.g., strongly
agree to strongly disagree).
Only 22% of teachers responded to the
survey. The views of the majority 78%
of new teachers were not captured.
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Cowman 2004 Alternative certification
Unclear results
But looks like mentoring did not
influence retention
All programs had relatively high
rates of retention;
ACP had the highest retention
(96.81%), followed by ECP (90%)
and then CPDT (89.9%).
CPDT teachers reported
receiving the most support as
they were paired with
experienced teachers during the
internship, they have the highest
attrition. This suggests that
factors other than mentoring
and support could determine
teachers’ decision to leave.
ACP had the highest retention
rates likely because of their
selective process.
Record of attrition may not be accurate.
Teachers who are still teaching but have
left the state of Texas are treated as
teachers who have left the profession
because their employment histories are
no longer trackable.
Those who left temporarily (e.g.,
maternity) sare treated as having left
teaching.
Croffut 2015 Mentoring and Induction
No effect
Turnover rate of beginning
teachers in the district decreased
by 1 percentage point between
2012–2014 and 2014–2015.
Comparing teachers’ self-report
intention to stay or not, showed
no difference between expected
and actual response rate. In fact,
actual response rate was 88%
compared to the expected rate of
90%.
High level of missing data (only 29%
responded to survey). Therefore
responses could be from self-selected
individuals.
Evidence of bias in reporting
Despite the data showing no effect,
the author concluded “While there is no
statistically significant difference,
the data reveal the district is
maintaining the beginning teacher
turnover rate which would indicate the
district’s beginning teacher program is
positively impacting the teacher
retention rate”
Dwinal 2012
Alternative certification
(Teach For America)
No effect
Based on interviews with
superintendents and principals with
low response rates (under 20%). Poor
reporting. Based on vacancies not
placements.
Eberhard,
Reinhardt-Mondragon
and Stottlemyer 2000
Mentoring and
Alternative Certification
+ effect of mentoring (compared
to no mentoring)
+ effect of alternative
certification (compared to
standard certification)
Negative effect of emergency
certification compared to fully
certified teachers
The groups were no randomly selected
and as the authors reported, this may be
reflective of the kind of pre-service
students who would sign up for the
more intensive one-year programme.
No actual retention data presented.
Elmore 2003 Mentoring
No difference in retention rates
although retention of teachers
using MTC continued to
increase over 2 years while those
using peer mentors continued to
decrease
No pure control
Comparison was with Peer Mentors
and Mentor Teacher Consultants
Schools were selected for MTC based on
high turnover rates and low
performance. Schools are therefore
different
Fleener 1998 Alternative certification
Positive effect
for field-based training (2.1%
attrition) compared to
university-based training (6.7%)
The 2 groups are self-selected so may be
different in terms of motivation and
commitment. Also a large number who
did not end up in state-funded teaching
were excluded. This may have already
excluded those who would be likely to
leave teaching anyway
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Fowler 2003
Massachussets Signing
Bonus
- No effect on recruiting to
high need districts (no
comparator, so cannot
calculate ES)
There was no comparison group. It was
simply an analysis of the data on bonus
recipients and their outcomes.
Fuller (2003) Mentoring
+ effect on retention
Although differences in
retention rates of participants
and non-participants are
“significant” effect sizes
calculated by reviewer are small
(around 0.05 for all the 3 years)
Participants were self-selected or
“qualified” for inclusion. Therefore
groups being compared were different.
The programme had a lot of
components, so it was difficult to isolate
the effects of mentoring
In some all beginning teachers had a
mentor, in others there were few or no
mentoring for new teachers
Gaikhorst et al., 2015
Professional
development for
beginning teachers
No effect on retention
Evidence based on teachers’ report of
their intention to stay.
Experimental teachers were those who
volunteered to take part. These were
compared with those who did not take
part
Gold 1987
Mentoring (New York
City retired
teachers-as-mentors
programme)
Lowers attrition rates among
mentored teachers compared to
non-mentored, but tiny numbers
This was a small-scale RCT. Although
principals were asked to assign mentors
at random, it was not clear how this was
done. In some cases teachers rejected
the offer of a mentor. Assignment was
therefore no longer random
Goldhaber, Destler and
Player 2010
Financial incentives
+ effect
Additional $5790 needed for a
50% increase in number of
teachers teaching in schools
with high proportion of minority
children, but only $706 extra for
a 50% increase in number of
teachers teaching in high
poverty schools
Not focused on recruitment and
retention specifically
Gordon and Vegas 2004
FUNDEF (Financial
incentives)
Increase in number of teachers
in poorer regions but no effect
on proportion of secondary
teachers with higher degrees
Not relevant to English context
(funding reform in Brazil).
The analyses are correlational and did
not take into account other confounding
factors
Hancock 2008
External support,
mentoring and induction
and financial incentives
Mentoring and induction did
not predict likelihood of attrition
Parent and administrative
support reduced the risk of
attrition
Salary is also significant. For
every I unit increase in salary
bracket (c. $10,000), there is a
38% reduction in risk
(OR = 0.62).
The evidence is based on a large sample
of participants based on administrative
data. But because the evidence is based
on self-report of intention to stay or
leave, the evidence is not strong
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Hansen et al., 2016
Alternative certification
(Teach for America)
Effects are mixed.
Clustering has a positive effect
on retention of teachers in
schools in the district.
The higher the density of TFA
corps members in a school
increases, they are less likely to
move schools within district
However, it has a negative effect
on retention of teachers within
district. A 1 percentage point
increase in TFA density in the
school is associated with a 1.5%
greater likelihood of exiting the
district
This study can only establish correlation
but not causality. It also cannot
determine the direction of causation.
It is possible that schools with high
out-of-district exits are more likely to
rely on TFA staffing.
Hardie 2008
[full paper not available)
Alternative preparation No effect on retention
The two groups of teachers were not
randomly allocated and no controls
were made of teacher background
characteristics
Harrell and Harris 2006
Alternative certification
(Online
post-baccalaureate
teacher certification
programme)
+ effect on recruiting males
(ES = 0.2) and minority
candidates (ES = 0.19)
+ effect on recruiting maths and
science
teachers (ES = 0.2)
+ effect on recruiting career
changers (no comparison for ES
calculation)
Because of self-selection into
programmes candidates who signed up
for traditional programmes are likely to
be different to those who signed up for
the online programme. The groups are
therefore not balanced.
Also comparison is made for only one
year, it is not possible to rule out other
exogenous factors (e.g., economic
performance) which may have affected
a larger number of people who change
career
Data was taken from one faculty in one
institution and for one academic year
only. Sample may not be generalised to
other years and institutions. Hence the
1
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teachers who received a small award rather than no award. However, this study found that teachers 
who received a large award were less likely than teachers who received a small award to be retained 
in the district. Perhaps teachers in receipt of a large award are high performing teachers who can 
easily find better paid jobs elsewhere. 
Springer, Swain and Rodriquez [99] evaluated the US$5000 retention bonus program for 
effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high mi ority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately high evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
rating.
Harris-McIntyre 2014 Induction
No clear effect
No evidence that alternative
(on-the-job training as in Teach
First in England) has been
effective in retaining teachers in
the district.
However, non lateral teachers
were over twice more likely to
stay in teaching in the first and
second year, but no difference in
the 3rd year
The teachers were neither randomis d
nor m tched by background
characteristics. There are likely to b
unobservable differences which have
not been controlled for in the analysis.
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Henke, Chen and
Geis 2000
Induction
+ effect on retention (15% left
compared to 26% not on
induction programme,
ES = 0.27)
Used data from the Baccalaureate and
Beyond Longitudinal Survey (n = 7294)
It is not clear how many missing cases
there were that had not been accounted
for. Also the two groups may be
different as teachers participating in
induction programmes may be in more
supportive schools with better working
conditions etc. So it is not possible to
attribute the lower attrition rate simply
to induction alone.
• The analysis is based on bivariate
correlations between two factors.
It could not account for
unobserved factors.
Henry, Bastian and
Adrienne 2012
Financial
Merit-based scholarships
+ recruitment of high quality
graduates (SAT scores of high
school scholars 113 points
higher than traditionally
prepared teachers and GPA
scores are 0.6 points higher
non-teaching fellows; ranked
among the top 10% of graduates)
+ retention (scholarship
recipients more than 1.1 times
more likely to stay on for 5 years
than other in-state prepared
teachers)
Comparisons were not made with
similar teachers
Scholarship recipients were high-flying
graduates who applied and were
therefore self-selected. Unobserved
confounders such as scholars’
motivations and intentions could not be
controlled for.
Hopkins 1997 Induction
No effect on retention (Effect
size = 0.03)
Groups not equivalent
Missing cases and non-response meant
that the groups were no longer balanced
Retention based on reported intention
Humphrey et al., 2018
Behaviour management
as CPD
No impact on teacher retention
(ES = −0.01)
A lot of missing data
Low compliance
No actual retention data (based on
teachers’ expression of intention)
Ingersoll, Merrill and
May 2014
Teacher preparation
Positive effect
Those that have more pedagogy
in their training were less likely
to leave
Training in teaching strategies
and methods made no difference
The study could not control for
unobserved differences.
Those who chose the traditional teacher
preparation route may view teaching as
a career to which they are committed.
Those with an education degree may be
more committed to teaching because
they have fewer alternative career
options than those with a maths or
science degree.
Jacobson 1988 Salary differentials
+ recruitment (positive
correlation between entry-level
salary ranking and recruitment
of highly qualified teachers
+ retention (positive correlation
between salary ranking of
mid-career teachers and
retention of mid-career teachers)
It is correlational in design, it is not able
to control for other confounding factors
such as the economic and political
differences in the districts
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Jones 2004 Mentoring
No effect
No difference between the
in-house and full-time
mentoring in terms of teachers’
reported intention to stay
(Cramer’s V effect size = 0.0067)
No differences between the two
groups in terms of reasons for
leaving
Lack of collaboration with
colleagues and administrative
and mentor support as top
reasons for leaving
1
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Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
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scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
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even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
Schools offeri g Ful -Time mentoring
program e were selected based on
certain criteria, not randomised.
Measure of retention was based on
participants’ self-report.
Kelley 2004 Induction and mentoring Positive effect on retention
Compare 10 cohorts of new teachers
with national average. These teachers
were self-selecte b sed on their
qualifications and also they received
higher salaries after completion than
most novice teachers.
The number involved in each year is
small (under 50)
Kelly and Northrop Teacher preparation
Teachers from less selective
training colleges are less likely
to leave their school (including
moving school and leaving
profession
Those from highly selective colleges
may have greater job opportunities.
Large amou t of missing data. Very
small sample from selective colleges.
Lawrason 2008 Teacher induction
Some positive responses but
weak links
Results collected from surveys of
participants’ reported intention
(compared with other induction
programmes)
Small sample of 54
Lyons 2007
Induction programme
(known as left X
programme)
+ effect
• Beginni g teach rs who
were exposed to all
programme types (i.e.,
better prepared) were less
likely to leave classroom
teaching or education than
those who were not.
This study was based on a comparison
of observed and predicted rates of
retention using logistic regression
analysis to control for observable
characteristics.
McBride 2012 Induction and mentoring
Positive effect
Association between induction
and mentoring variables,
and likelihood of teacher
remaining in teaching for the
following year
Uses 3 admin datasets looking at the
outcomes of those involved in induction
and mentoring.
McGlamery and
Edick 2004
Teacher induction
The CADRE project
Positive effect
Compared with national sample
(40% attrition rate), retention of
CADRE participants was 89%
over 5 years
153 1st and 2nd year CADRE teachers
Risk of selection bias
Mordan 2012
Mentoring of beginning
Career and Technical
Education teachers
Positive effect on retention.
Beginning CTE teachers
assigned a mentor were 6.64
times more likely to remain in
teaching
Uses 3 admin datasets (SASS, TFS and
BTLS)
Weak comparisons
Small target group (N = 110)
Focus of study was on teachers’
experience rather than retention
outcomes
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Morrell and Salomon
(2017)
Scholarship scheme Inconclusive
Claims that it was successful in
assisting undergraduates with a STEM
background into teaching, but not
supported by the data
Murphy 2004
Grow Your Own
(A collaborative
partnership with local
education agencies,
community colleges,
private and public
schools)
Positive effect
Large percentage of participants
who have received Consortium
services have remained in
continuous employment in
North Carolina’s schools
Weak causal evidence
Focus on participants in the Consortium
programmes
No comparison with non participants
Odell and Ferraro 1992 Mentoring + effect on retention
There was no control group and the
groups were not matched nor was there
an attempt to find similar, or matched
districts to serve as the comparison.
This is important since the districts in
question might have already been
higher-retaining districts (or at least
higher than the state average.
Ogunyemi 2013 Mentoring
Some claims about perceived
impact of mentoring on
retention
Self-report, no comparison group and
high attrition
Oliver 2016 Mentoring
Suggests that the use of social
media platform increases
retention of induction year
maths teachers
Ethnographic accounts based on
participant observations and field
notes—not a study which aims to find
causal/correlational outcomes linked to
retention
Parker, Ndoye and
Imig 2009
Mentoring
Positive effect of same subject
and grade level mentors on
retention
Sample included 8838 beginning
teachers being mentored for 2 years.
Outcome was teachers’ intention to stay
not actual retention
Partridge 2008 Mentoring
No effect of mentoring on
participants’ intention to stay
Survey based on 71 teachers (only 12
were assigned a mentor). The data was
delimited to information provided by a
portion of elementary teachers in one
public school district so might not
reflect the opinion of all members of the
included population. Responses were
subject to the validity of
self-perceptions regarding mentoring.
Perry 2008 Induction Minority teachers
Small sample (n = 22). No clear data
presented to make judgements about
the validity of the findings
Protik et al., 2015 Cash transfer incentive No effect—uptake was low
0
No comparison so not possible to say
what the uptake would be in the
absence of the incentive
Quartz 2003
Induction and ongoing
professional
development in left X
Positive effect
Over 5 years 70% of left X
graduates remain in classroom
compared to 61% nationally
based on SASS (ES = 0.69)
Comparison with national figures
Participants were self-selected (bias
selection)
The focus of the study is on the reason
why teachers stay or leave
Randall 2009 Mentoring
The teachers reported that the
mentors had no effect on their
decision to remain in the
classroom.
Not impact evaluation.
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Reynolds and Wang 2005
Professional
development
Positive effect
PDS graduates less likely to
leave teaching (20%) than
non-PDS graduates (17%)
ES = 0.26
Compared PDS with non-PDS
graduates
High attrition/nonresponse
Reynolds, Ross and
Rakow 2002
Professional
development
No effect
No retention differences
between PDS and non-PDS route
Small sample (N = 191)
Attrition 58%
No data on retention presented
Ridgely 2016 Induction
Compare two models of
induction. Suggests that
dual-role induction was more
effective in keeping teachers
thana site-based induction.
Comparison was between 2 types of
induction programme. No
counterfactual. So cannot rule out other
differences between the 2 districts who
could have explained the different
retention rates. There was also a huge
disparity in numbers between the two
districts being compared.
Robertson-Kraft
2014/2018
Teacher performance
management
Quicker turnover rates in
INVEST pilot schools
Paperwork relating to INVEST
contributed to wanting to leave
Schools are not randomly allocated
High non-response
No report of actual retention data
(based on teacher’s self-report)
Robertson-Phillips 2010
Teacher induction
Beginning Teacher
Support and Assessment
Program
No effect on retention
Retention of BTSA teachers
similar to the intern programme
Compared RIMS/BTSA teachers with
intern teachers
Groups not randomly assigned
Data based on perceptions of
participants
Rothstein (2015)
Types of contract
(permanent vs
temporary
No impact on supply. Bonus
contract is less effective than the
tenure contract in increasing the
number of high ability teachers
(ES +0.004 and +0.033
respectively).
Retention policies are effective
only if there is substantial
increase in salary. If budget is
fixed, may need to increase class
sizes to offset the higher salary
of teachers
The models are based on a number of
caveats which are not possible in reality.
It assumes that teacher performance
assessment is unbiased and that new
teachers are recruited from the same
population as current teachers ignoring
the fact that there are potentially high
ability teachers who would not consider
teaching at all.
Rogers 2015 Induction
Found no link between
induction programme and
retention
Online survey, very low response (34%),
no clear comparator. Evidence based on
school leaders’ and administrators’
report. No actual retention data
Scott et al. (2006)
Scholarship, tuition fee
remission and mentoring
+ effect on recruitment (an
increase of over 100% from in 37
1st year to 80 in the 3rd year). In
the 4th year 100 enrolled
80% indicated that they would
stay on.
(no comparison group).
Retention is based on
participants’ self-report of
intention to stay on the course,
not teaching in general.
There is no comparison group, so it is
not possible to attribute the increase in
the number of students enrolled on the
teacher certification course solely to the
MASS programme. The retention rate is
the retention on the programme and is
based on students’ report of their
intention rather than actual staying on
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Shen, J. 1997
Alternative route to
teaching
Successful in recruiting minority
and shortage subject teachers
and increasing supply of
teachers in urban areas
However, AC teachers tend to
have lower qualifications
AC less successful in attracting
experience personnel from other
occupations
Most new college graduates
opted for the AC to avoid the
traditional teacher education
programme
AC teachers less likely to treat
teaching as a lifelong career
No impact on retention
(retention not measured but
based on participants’ report of
intention to stay)
Given that AC and TC teachers were
not randomised there are important
differences between them. Those who
chose the AC route may have different
motivations from those who chose the
TC route. It’s also possible that those
who entered via the AC route were not
eligible for the TC programme because
of their lower academic qualifications.
Shepherd 2009
Claimed that the Induction
program had a positive effect,
but given the data presented, it
is not possible to know if this
can be attributed to the program.
Data gathered from stakeholders
through surveys, focus group
discussions and interviews. No
causal/correlational evidence clearly
presented. Poor reporting of samples.
Sims (2017) Salary compensation
+ effect on recruitment and
retention
Increase in the total supply of
teachers (recruitment deficit ES
= 1.3 for science and 1.4 for
maths
The model made a number of
assumptions, e.g., Teachers missing in
the School Workforce are taken to have
left teaching, the reduction in
probability of leaving the profession is
evenly spread across each year of the
policy, Increased pay does not
incentivize more people to train in
each cohort
Spuhler and Zetler
1993–1995
Mentoring
Positive effect on retention. In
the second year 92% of
mentored teachers compared to
73% of non-mentored teachers
were still teaching. Effect size is
0.12.
In the 3rd year all the mentored
teachers continued teaching but
only 70% of non-mentored
teachers remained in teaching
(ES = 0.12)
The small sample size meant that the
results could not be generalised.
The comparison teachers were not
matched in any way.
Stinebrickner 1998 Wages
+ impact on retention
Teachers paid higher salary 9%
more likely to stay on in
teaching for more than 5 years
than teachers paid the mean
wage
Attrition was 70%, hence the 1
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effective teachers in Tennessee’s Priority Schools (high poverty, high minority schools). The study 
showed that the bonus incentive increased the retention of teachers in tested subjects and grades, but 
not the retention of Level 5 (Diploma in Education and Training) teachers. This was a quasi-
experimental study using a regression discontinuity design exploiting the sharp cut-off in a teacher’s 
overall evaluation rating that determines eligibility for the retention bonus in participating schools. 
Nationally representative administrative data supplemented by county-level economic data and data 
from the TVAAS and Tennessee’s online teacher evaluation platform, CODE (contains value-added 
estimates for teachers) were utilised for the analysis. The sample included all teachers working in 
Priority Schools in Tennessee during the 2012–2013 school year. 
Three moderately h gh evidence studies (3🔒) found no effect of financial incentives on teacher 
retention. Steele et al. [89] evaluated the Governor’s Teaching Fellowship (GTF) scheme, involving a 
$20,000 incentive to attract new teachers to low-performing schools. Teachers had to repay $5000 for 
each of the first four year that they did not meet the commitment. There was no difference in retention 
rates (75% over four years) between recipient and non-recipients, despite the penalty clause. 
Using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, Clotfelter et al. [100,101] compared 
hazard rates before and after the implementation of the bonus programme; eligible and ineligible 
teachers in the same schools using a hybrid of a randomized experiment and a regression 
discontinuity design. This is the North Carolina bonus incentive aimed at retaining qualified teachers 
in targeted subjects in high poverty or academically challenging schools. Under this scheme teachers 
were eligible for an annual bonus of $1800 if they taught in an eligible school, and will continue to 
receive the bonus as long as they stayed in the same school and taught the same subjects. Overall, the 
results suggest that the bonus incentive did not reduce turnover rates. However, it is not clear 
whether this is because the $1800 bonus was not large enough or is it because there was a flaw in the 
design and implementation of the program as not all teachers who were eligible actually received the 
bonus. Survey responses from principals and teachers indicated that the $1800 bonus alone was not 
enough to retain teachers. They suggested that administrative support, improving school conditions 
and facilitating professional development might be better options. Comparison was made with 
teachers across eligible schools and those in schools that narrowly missed out based on the threshold 
eligibility. The results showed that teachers receiving a bonus were 15% less likely to leave at the end 
of the school year compared to other teachers in the same school. This increased to 17% after 
controlling for subject taught. A 10% increase reduces the probability of teachers leaving by 1–4% 
points. However, this reflects a pattern already in place even before the programme was introduced. 
Including the school fixed effects in the regression the effect was negative. 
In a cluster randomised control trial, Fryer [102] examined a school-wide performance bonus 
scheme that provided performance bonuses to school staff based on their schools’ progress report. 
Using both an intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-of-the-treated analyses, the results showed that 
the teacher performance bonus program had no effect on teacher retention. Some reasons suggested 
for the nil effect included incentives not being large enough, incentive scheme was too complex and 
group-based incentives may not be effective. Participating schools were given a lump sum incentive 
on $3000 per full union teacher. Schools could decide to award a subset of teachers with the highest 
value-added or divide among teachers by lottery. The majority of schools opted for group incentives. 
Data on students and teachers from 396 high-need public elementary, middle, and high schools from 
2007–2008 through 2009–2010 were analysed. Schools were selected based on some criteria, e.g., level 
of poverty. Of these schools, 233 were randomly assigned to the intervention group and 163 to the 
comparison group. Retention outcomes in schools that were offered participation in the program—
even if they ultimately declined to participate—were compared with the outcomes in schools that 
were not offered the opportunity to participate. 
The data is poor with only 30% of
teachers being tracked. We are therefore
not sure how different the results w uld
be if data for all the teachers we e
available. Those that did not respond
are likely to be different to those who
did. Also the survey asked teachers to
recall their teaching experience.
This can be subjective depending on
their experience at the time of the
survey and may not accurately reflect
what actually happened.
Tai, Liu and Fan (2006)
Alternative certification
of maths and science
teachers
No difference between
alternative and traditionally
certified teachers
Used admin data (SASSand TFS)
Missing data
Lapse time between SASS and TFS is
only one year. Longer evaluation
needed to test sustained effect
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Study Strategy Impact Evidence
Toterdell, Heilbronn,
Bubb and Jones 2002
Induction
Focused on the positive
experience of NQTs
Not impact evaluation. Limited focus
on retention or attempts to measure this
in a coherent way. Looks at perceptions
of new programme and some
implementation but little in the way of
actual outcomes.
Troutt 2014
Professional Learning
Communities (PLCs)
Claims PLCs improve retention
No pre- post comparison. Made
conclusions based on comparison of a
high retention and low retention school.
The schools may be systematically
different in terms of pupil intake,
location etc, which could have
influenced retention. Therefore, not
possible to attribute success to the
programme. Used school-level rather
than individual teacher retention Poor
reporting.
Uttley 2006 Mentoring Suggests positive effect
Evidence based on survey of teachers’
perceptions about the effectiveness of
the programme, collected at one time
point. Non response was 45%.
Van Overschelde,
Saunders and Ash 2017
Professional
development
programme
Texas State University
teacher preparation
programme
Positive effect
85% of Texas State University’s
graduates teaching after 5 years
compared to 71% for average
state retention rate (ES =0.9)
Retention also higher.
Comparison institutions not randomly
allocated. Did not control for teacher
and institutional characteristics.
Wells 2011
Financial incentives
Team performance pay
No effect in the 1st and 2nd year
Difference-in-difference approach
comparing retention before, during
implementation and a year later
Teachers’ report of retention and the
district data not consistent
Wilkinson 2009
Induction for alternative
certification programme
students
Comparisons were made with 7
different cohorts of students, who were
lumped together as one despite possible
differences in contexts/backgrounds.
Evidence based on survey collecting
respondents’ report of satisfaction with
the programme and correlation analysis
of their responses with their intention
to stay
Zavala 2002
Alternative certification
vs field-based training
CPDT (field-based training)
appears to impact retention
positively
Two types of teacher preparation not
randomly assigned. So not sure how
field-base training is compared to
traditional teacher preparation.
Zhang and Zeller 2016
Alternative routes into
teaching
Long-term retention rates are
greater for traditional
certification programme than
ACP
Small sample (58 teachers were tracked
over 7 years. 22 regular, 20 lateral entry
and 18 NC teachers.
Groups self-selected not randomly
assigned.
Zumwalt et al., 2017
Alternative route to
teaching
• Positive results for
recruitment but weak
evidence as not comparison
group data available.
• Negative results for
retention of maths teachers
The evidence is weak as these measures
were largely based on correlation and
pre-post comparisons without any
control. e.g., the increase in the
proportion of qualified primary
teachers coincided with the legislation
that teachers should be qualified.
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